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SUMMARY 
 
PRODUCTION BASED POLLUTION EXTERNALITIES AND 
INTRA -INDUSTRY TRADE 
 
Suphi ŞEN 
 
Environmental pollution is one of the major problems countries are facing in 
this century. Most of the countries are trying to protect themselves using 
various policies to prevent pollution. This paper is an attempt to determine 
optimal environmental policies under different circumstances. We construct a 
partial equilibrium model with two identical countries and two firms. Each firm 
is operating at its home country. Firms are producing homogeneous goods to be 
consumed in both countries. Each government’s policy instruments are import 
tariff and quantity restriction on pollution. Every individual country is affected 
from the pollution generated during the production process of its own firm. The 
technology for abating the pollution is available to both firms. Agents play a 
three-stage game. At the first stage, governments determine  the quantity 
restriction levels on pollution. At the second stage, governments determine  the 
import tariffs. At the third stage, firms choose their output levels observing 
these policy instruments. Firstly, the model shows that efficiency in pollution 
abatement technology plays a crucial role on welfare maximizing behaviour of 
governments. A critical level of pollution abatement technology determines the 
preponderance of environmental misgivings in their welfare maximizing 
behavior. More efficient the firms in pollution abatement technology, 
governments’ are inclined to be less strict in their policies to reduce negative 
environmental externalities. Secondly, our analysis compares optimal policies 
under non-cooperative and cooperative behaviour of governments for 
environmental policies. By cooperation, in environmental policies, 
environmental pollution can be reduced.  Furthermore, we examine the effects 
of the liberalizing trade on environment. Free trade makes governments to be 
less strict in their policies about environment. 
Keywords: Intra-industry Trade, Pollution Quota, Trade and Environment 
JEL Codes: F1, H2 
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ÖZET 
 
ÜRETİM KAYNAKLI KİRLİLİK VE ENDÜSTRİİÇİ TİCARET 
 
Suphi Şen 
 
Son yüzyılın en büyük sorunlarindan biri çevre kirliliğidir. Ülkeler kirliliği 
önlemek için çeşitli politikalara başvurmaktadır. Bu çalışmada çeşitli 
durumlarda ülkelerin başvurduğu optimal çevre politikalari incelenmektedir. 
Bu amaçla iki ülkeli ve iki firmalı bir kısmi denge modeli oluşturduk. Her 
ülkede bir firma faaliyet etmektedir. Üretim hem yerli hem de yabancı pazar 
için yapılmaktadır. Hükümetlerin politika araçları ihracat tarifesi ve kirlilik 
kotasıdır. Ülkeler sadece yerel firmanın oluşturduğu kirlilikten etkilenmektedir. 
Kirliliği azaltma teknolojisi her firma için ulaşılabilirdir. Model üç aşamalı bir 
oyundan oluşmaktadır. Birinci aşamada hükümetler kirlilik kotasını belirler. 
İkinci aşamada yine hükümetler ihracat tarifelerini belirler. Son aşamada 
firmalar üretim miktarlarina karar verirler. Öncelikle hükümetlerin refah 
ençoklamasında, kirliliği azaltma teknolojisinin kritik bir önem taşıdığını 
gösterdik. Kirliliği önleme teknolojisin kritik bir seviyesi, hükümetlerin refah 
ençoklarken çevre hassasitinden ne kadar ödün vereceklerini belirlemektedir. 
Firmalar kirliliği önlemede etkinleştikçe hükümetler çevre politikalarında daha 
gevşek davranmaktadır. Ayrıca çevre politikalarında işbirliğinin kirlilik üzerine 
etkisi yine kirliliği önleme teknolojisinin etkinliğine bağlıdır. Son olarak serbest 
ticarete geçişin çevre politikalarina etkisi incelenmiştir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Endüstriiçi Ticaret, Kirlilik Kotası, Ticaret ve Çevre 
Bilim Dalı Sayısal Kodu: F1, H2 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Debates over globalization have been going on for decades. However, recently a new 
dimension has come out. This is the relationship between international trade and 
environment. Globalization is associated with liberalization of international trade. It 
is argued that this is beneficial since the apparent increase in real world income has 
been attributed to the liberalization of international trade. Fruits of international trade 
have been put forward since the early economists. However, recently 
environmentalists argue against the trade liberalization by considering the 
environmental consequences of international trade. The debate between 
environmentalists and international trade lobbies is one of the most debated topics 
about globalization.  
World Trade Organization (WTO) is the main institute which governs international 
trade. They set out some procedures for countries to be followed in their international 
trade relationships. The main purpose of WTO is liberalizing world trade. Among the 
rules of WTO there are also some regulations about environmental issue. 
Governments can put some restrictions in order to preserve natural life and resources.  
Thus, governments can apply interventions such as import tariffs, quotas and 
subsidies. When the matter is consumption based pollution, governments have the 
chance to apply environmental policies directly. On the other hand, if the matter is 
production based pollution governments may use international trade policies in order 
to preserve its environmental quality. One of the problems that are proposed by 
international trade policy community is that there is the possibility that governments 
may protect themselves against international competition as if they were making 
environmental protectionism. 
Environmentalists argue that higher economic activity will be associated with a 
decrease in environmental quality. Moreover, less developed countries will adopt 
less tough environmental standards in order to gain an advantage in international 
trade. Therefore, they conclude that free trade is harmful to environment. 
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Copeland and Taylor (2003) summarize the debate over environment and 
international trade as follows. Firstly, international trade effects the environment 
through increasing economic activity. Since pollution occurs as a result of production 
and consumption which increases with economic activity, environmental 
consequences of international trade may outweigh its income generating advantages. 
Secondly, international trade changes the composition of trade pattern of a country. 
Pollution intensive production may shift to less developed countries and may create 
pollution heavens. Moreover, via transboundary pollution, whole world may suffer 
from the consequences of this effect.  
Copeland and Taylor (2003) put forward two core questions to be analyzed in order 
to understand the relationship between international trade and environment.  
Firstly, what is the relationship between environment and increasing economic 
activity due to international trade? Deep green environmentalists argue that 
increasing economic activity is absolutely harmful for the environment. Therefore, 
they conclude that international trade is harmful to environment. On the other hand, 
there is the income generating advantages of international trade. Supporters of free 
trade argue that as income gains increase, countries will be more willing to preserve 
environment. Moreover, the technical ability to apply environmental regulations will 
improve with the increasing income.  
Secondly, Copeland and Taylor (2003) put forward the question, how the 
international trade relations of a country are effected from environmental regulations. 
The concern of the question is to analyze the situation in which pollution intensive 
industries migrate to less developed countries where environmental regulations are 
less tough. Therefore, environmental regulations may create a different specialization 
across the world in which poor countries specialize in the production of dirty goods 
and rich countries specialize in the production of clean goods. Therefore, the 
developing part of the world may become a pollution heaven. Furthermore, 
environmental regulation may be subject to the competitiveness of the developing 
world country and international agreements may become impossible.  
As it is mentioned by Copeland and Taylor (2003), there is a strong relationship 
between environmental regulations and trade patterns of countries. When the concern 
is the inter-industry trade, mostly occurs between developed and developing 
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countries, there might be specialization due to the pollution incentives of industries. 
On the other hand, today, most of the world trade occurs as intra industry trade in 
which similar products are traded between countries. In this case the countries are 
mostly at the same development level. This does not mean that the composition 
effect of international trade is worthless. Indeed, transfer of old technologies of an 
industry creates intra-industry trade between developed and less developed countries. 
However, it is clear that intra-industry trade has its own characteristics. 
Environmental pollution in an intra-industry trade case may be generated through 
consumption or production of goods. One of the main concerns of governments when 
making policy about international trade is the environmental damage arises during 
the production of goods which are subject to intra-industry trade. It is very common 
that there exists a two way trade of identical goods between countries in which the 
countries are subject to pollution generated during the production process of these 
goods. In order to analyze the interrelated relationship between trade policies, 
environmental regulations and their effects on welfare we construct a partial 
equilibrium model.  
In this paper we study the production based generated pollution externalities. We 
developed a partial equilibrium model in which there are two countries and two 
firms. Each firm is operating at its home country. Firms are producing homogeneous 
goods to be consumed in both countries. Each government’s policy instruments are 
import tariff and quantity restriction on pollution. Every individual country is 
affected from the pollution generated during the production process of its own firm. 
The technology for abating the pollution is available to both firms. Agents play a 
three-stage non-cooperative game. At the first stage, governments determine the 
quantity restriction levels on pollution given the firms output levels. At the second 
stage, governments determine the import tariffs. At the third stage, firms choose their 
output levels for any given level of policy instruments.   
Firstly, we will show that efficiency in pollution abatement technology plays a 
crucial role on welfare maximizing behavior of governments. A critical level of 
pollution abatement technology determines the preponderance of environmental 
misgivings in their welfare maximizing behavior. Secondly, we will extend our 
analysis by examining the cooperation in environmental policy between countries 
and examining the effects of the liberalizing trade on environmental policies. 
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In the preceding part of the paper a literature survey is presented in the area of intra 
industry trade, environment and production based pollution externalities. Then, the 
model constructed will be presented. In the last part, the conclusions derived due to 
the model will be explained. 
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2 LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 International Trade and Environment 
Since Ricardo, international trade has been regarded as beneficial by mainstream 
economics. International trade induces specialization and leads to international 
division of labor. By producing the goods which they can most efficiently produce, 
each country uses its comparative advantage to increase global output and gains from 
international trade will accrue to all countries. This view has been challenged by 
many streams of economics. Most recently, environmentalists argue against the 
general view about the free trade.  
2.1.1 Debates over International Trade and Environment 
There is a multi-dimensional relationship between increased trade flows and 
environmental issues. Field and Field (2002) summarize this relationship as follows. 
Firstly, the mutual relationship between trade and environment arise the question of 
what are the causes and effects; How does increased trade effect environment and 
how does the environmental degradation effects international trade. Secondly, should 
countries use trade policies in order to reduce environmental damage? Finally, is 
collaboration needed in order to improve environmental quality on the world as a 
whole? These questions are explained by many opposed point of views such as 
environmentalists and international trade lobbies  
Rauscher (1997) proposes four reasons for the environmentalists to regard 
international trade harmful to environment. Firstly, some countries may specialize in 
the production of dirty goods and the welfare loss caused by environmental 
degradation in these countries may outweigh the welfare gains through free trade. 
Besides, if this pollution has a transboundary effect, many countries can be subject to 
this effect. Secondly, mainstream economics predicts that international trade induces 
the world to produce and consume more which means more pollution. This may 
cause waste management problems. Thirdly, mobile factor movements due to 
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environmental regulations may create pollution heavens. Some countries will adjust 
their environmental policies in order attract mobile factors of production. This may 
cause competition among countries which may have disastrous consequences.  The 
fourth problem is the trade in hazardous wastes. It is clear that the exporters of these 
materials are more advance in storing or processing these materials than the 
importers. The sixth problem is that international trade requires transportation which 
is the most important polluting activities. As the sixth problem, it is argued that third 
world countries will never break their dependence on imports and they can never 
achieve a development level to apply sufficient environmental regulations.  
There are also attempts of free trade lobbies against the environmental regulations. 
Rauscher (1997) states that free trade lobbies are against the polluter-pays principal 
which enforces the one who causes damage to pay the social cost of the activity.  
However, such a policy will lead pollution-intensive industries to move pollution 
heavens.  
It is undeniable that free trade has important effects on environment. Regulations on 
international trade also have important effects on environmental quality. Besides 
environmental policies have sound effects on international trade. This mutual 
relationship between international trade and environment arise the question for an 
economist “Is free trade still good when environment is taken into consideration”.  
Environmental regulations sometimes cause distortions in international trade. For 
example in some cases governments uses environmental policies in order to 
discriminate between domestic goods and imported goods. So the borderline between 
true and pretended protectionism is not clear.   Rauscher (1997) predicts that one of 
the main issues in the future will be, making international trade agreements and 
environmental arguments consistent. 
2.1.2 International Trade and Environment: Theory 
In the literature, many models have been set up in order to investigate the dimensions 
of the relationship between trade and environment.   
Copeland and Taylor (1994-a) set up a north-south model in order to investigate the 
relationship between national income, pollution and international trade. In their 
model, two countries are producing goods which differ in pollution effect. They 
figure out that technologically developed country specializes in clean goods and its 
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environmental policies are stricter. Besides they show that free trade increases 
pollution. Furthermore, an increase in North’s production possibilities frontier 
increases pollution, while any improvement in South’s production possibilities 
frontier reduces pollution. 
Copeland and Taylor (1994-b) examines that how pollution is effected from national 
income levels and trade opportunities. Their findings show that higher the income 
inequality across countries, higher the level of global pollution due to free trade.  
Secondly, they show that if factor prices are equalized due to trade, than human 
capital abundant countries are more advantages. Thirdly, if pollution permits are 
subject to free trade, than pollution decreases. Finally, environmental policies are 
useless when they are used for trade objectives.  
Copeland and Taylor (1996) predict that pollution intensive sectors tend to move to 
countries where environmental policies are lax. In their paper, they emphasize the 
distinction between consumption based pollution and production based pollution. 
They conclude that pollution heaven hypothesis holds for consumption based 
pollution as well as production based pollution.  
Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001) try to find out that if liberalization in goods 
market is good for environment. For this purpose, they construct a model to classify 
the impacts of trade on pollution into three groups: scale, technique and composition. 
If free trade changes composition of national income, it does not effect pollution. 
However, if the main effects are scale and technique effects, it reduces pollution. 
They find a surprising result: the net effect of trade on environment is positive. 
To conclude, models in the literature are constructed to show different dimensions of 
the relationship between environment and trade. The effect of trade on environment 
is explained as positive or negative due to the dimensions considered in the model.  
2.2 Intra Industry Trade 
Intra industry trade is the two way trade of identical goods between countries. These 
goods can be differentiated in quality or brand. Due to these reasons, consumers may 
prefer the domestically produced goods or the imported goods. Today, largest part of 
the international trade occurs as intra industry trade. NAPES (National Asia Pacific 
Economic and Scientific Data Base) intra industry trade index shows that in the 
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period from 1993 to 1995, 95 percent of international trade occurred as intra industry 
trade. Due to its large share in the international trade, intra-industry trade is very 
important in the interaction between trade policies and environmental policies.  
2.2.1 Motivations of Intra-Industry Trade  
International trade have two forms, inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade. It is 
called inter-industry trade if different commodities are traded. In intra-industry trade, 
similar commodities are exchanged. In the trade literature intra-industry trade had 
been a neglected form until a few decades. The reason is obvious, the great influence 
of Ricardian comparative advantage theory and Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowment 
theory. Both theories suggest that countries should specialize in producing specific 
goods. For example, in a Ricardian world countries can not import and export the 
same good. In the pre-World War II period, economists assumed countries specialize 
in production and trade. In the post World War II period, it is suggested that intra-
industry trade is a post war phenomena. However, since specialization is a 
recommendation by David Ricardo, we can predict that two way-trade was an 
existing and unwanted form of trade even in early 1980’s.  
Balassa (1966) is one of the earliest economists who notice the importance of intra-
industry trade. He noticed the intra industry trade occurs in the developed part of the 
world and its consequences for economic development. Since then, a large volume of 
literature has been developed on this subject. The most important question to be 
answered is existence, why do countries trade similar products? Explanations for the 
existence of intra-industry trade can be grouped into supply-side and demand-side 
explanations.  
Demand side explanations focus on demand heterogeneity. Slightly differentiated 
goods, income inequalities or population growth creates different demand structures. 
Therefore, heterogeneity in demand may cause the country to import and export the 
same good.  
Krugman (1979) states that demand diversity due to product differentiation is a 
strong motive for intra-industry trade. Slightly differentiated goods in quality, design 
or size may lead the consumers to prefer different brands. He argues that domestic 
goods can not satisfy the diversity in demand. Therefore, intra-industry trade occurs 
inherently. 
9 
Linder (1961) argues that income inequalities between and within countries can be 
motivation for intra-industry trade. In a low income country domestic firms will be 
oriented towards satisfying low income consumers. However, in the same country 
there must be high income consumers whose needs will be satisfied by the products 
which are produced by the firms of a foreign country which is oriented towards high 
income consumers since its country is a high income country. Therefore, Linder 
(1961) suggests an explanation for the intra-industry trade which occurs between 
developed part of the world and rest of the world. 
Hamilton and Kniest (1991) state that intra-industry trade may be a result of 
population growth. As population grows, demand for slightly differentiated products 
will increase. The reason is that there would be a more heterogeneous demand in 
tastes.  
Demand side explanations are necessary to explain existence of intra industry trade 
but not sufficient. Supply side explanations are valid to explain the existence of intra 
industry trade. 
Supply side motivation of intra industry trade can be classified into two groups: 
Country specific explanations and industry specific explanations. Country specific 
explanations focus on the factor proportions in producing the similar products. 
Helpman (1981) having similar proportion in factor endowments leads countries to 
make more intra industry trade. Moreover it is argued that intra industry trade will 
occur in industries in which K/L ratio has a lower dispersion. Dispersion is simply 
the standard deviation of K/L ratio of firms within an industry. When the dispersion 
is lower, the goods produced are more likely to be substitutable. They also state that 
these industries will face higher competition with foreign firms, assuming that 
consumers prefer diversity in quality and variety.  
Industry specific explanations are regarded with economies of scale and learning by 
doing. Krugman (1979, 1980) argue that scale economies in production is a main 
motivations of intra industry trade. In order to examine this issue, he constructs a two 
country – two firm model where similar goods are produced by the firms under 
increasing returns to scale. Due to trade, market extends, marginal costs decrease, 
volume of trade increases.  
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Brander and Krugman (1983) argue that reciprocal dumping, dumping of firm into 
the home country of rival firm, can occur in a natural way due to the oligopolistic 
competition between firms.  Thus, they show that reciprocal dumping can occur 
without the motivations such as transportation costs and economies of scale. They 
also show that if transport costs are low opening trade increases welfare of countries. 
On the other hand, if transport costs dominate the positive effect of free trade on 
welfare, there occurs a decline in welfare of countries. Furthermore, they also show 
that in the case of free entry, opening trade certainly increases welfare. 
One crucial concept in the model of Brander and Krugman (1983) is the segmented 
market concept proposed by Helpman (1982). The theory of oligopoly mostly 
focuses on single markets. However, there are many reasons for a multinational firm 
to exist in several markets. The basic reason is the transportation costs. Even the 
firms in different cities face different transportation costs. Therefore, these markets 
can be treated as different markets in theoretical models. Another reason for the 
segmentation is the taxes such as tariffs and export subsidies. To sum up, any reason 
which causes a cost differential among firms located in different places makes the 
firms to treat each market separately in their decisions.  
Learning by doing is another factor that leads to intra industry trade. Firms can learn 
to imitate the products of its competitors and this will lead the products to be more 
substitutable. As a result intra industry trade occurs.  
Also geographic localization of production may trigger intra industry trade. 
Geographic localization affects transportation costs which has an important effect on 
intra industry trade.  
To conclude, in order to explain the existence of intra-industry trade, both supply 
side and demand side explanations are necessary.   
2.2.2 Theory of Intra-Industry Trade  
One of the earliest contributions to the theoretical framework of intra-industry trade 
is from Paul Krugman (1979). He constructs a model in which existence of intra 
industry trade is explained through economies of scale. In the model there are two 
countries and labor is the only production factor. Therefore firms have the same K/L 
ratios. Both the countries have identical production technologies, increasing returns 
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to scale. He shows that intra industry trade occurs, in order to the firms to take the 
advantage of scale economies. 
Krugman (1980) develops a model through which he examines effects of the 
economies of scale and product differentiation on intra industry trade. In the model, 
firms have some monopoly power but monopolistic competition drives profit to zero. 
Due to increasing returns to scale, intra industry trade occurs. Each slightly 
differentiated good is produced in one country. It is argued that gains from trade 
higher when intra industry trade occurs rather than each country offers the whole 
range of slightly differentiated products.  
Using the same general equilibrium model Krugman (1981) reaches some 
conclusions on intra industry trade specialization. In the new version of his model, 
instead of two – two firm model, he used a two country- two industry model. In each 
country there are many firms each producing one good. On the demand side, goods 
are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. However, they are assumed to be perfect 
substitutes on the supply side.  Free entry of firms drives profits to zero. He shows 
that structure of the trade between countries depends on the similarity of the factor 
endowments of countries. More similar the factor endowments, more likely the 
countries to make intra industry trade. Also, he shows that type of trade is the crucial 
point in analyzing the effect of trade liberalization. If intra industry trade is the 
dominant type of trade, then liberalizing trade is beneficial.  
Brander (1981) emphasizes that Hechscher-Ohlin model and Ricardian model of 
international trade always assume that trade occurs in different goods. Every 
individual country specializes in the goods which they can produce most efficiently. 
However, by using a Cournot setting, it is possible to construct models which include 
intra industry trade. The crucial assumption of Cournot setting is that when firms are 
setting their output levels, they assume that other firms do not change their output 
level. Brander (1981) argues that Cournot strategy is a reasonable strategy for a firm 
to follow, since it does not require high information gathering costs and information 
processing costs.  In order to analyze inter industry trade, Brander (1981) constructs 
a two country – two firm model in which there is a two way trade of similar goods 
between countries. In the model, pattern of trade is determined by increasing returns 
to scale, transportation costs and firms’ imperfectly competitive behavior.  Through 
this model Brander (1981) shows that identical products can be traded across 
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countries despite efficiency loss due to transportation costs. As an example there is a 
two way trade between France and Germany in automotive sector. 
Existence of two way trade due to product quality is examined in a theoretical 
framework by Falvey and Kierzowski (1987). They construct a two country-two firm 
model. Product differentiation is due to product quality. As a fact, the higher the 
quality, the higher the K/L ratio. They argue that when quality is determined by the 
immobile factor, capital, then specialization will occur between countries. It is clear 
that, the capital abundant country will specialize in high quality goods, whereas labor 
intense country will specialize in low quality products. 
Davis (1995) develops a theoretical model in order to incorporate intra industry trade 
issue into the Ricardian trade model and Heckscher-Ohlin model. Three goods are 
produced, two to be traded in an intra industry type trade and one to be traded in an 
inter-industry type of trade. Model assumes that preferences are identical and 
homothetic, constant returns to scale and technological differentiation among 
countries. They show that both type of trade, inter-industry trade and intra-industry 
trade, occur at the equilibrium. Intra industry trade is a result of constant returns to 
scale and perfectly competitive markets.  
Schmitt and Yu (2001) find a positive link between scale economies and the volume 
of intra industry trade and share of trade in total production. In their model there is a 
monopolistic competition with traded and non-traded goods. 
To conclude, starting by 1970’s, search for alternative theoretical framework to 
explain intra-industry trade gave results by 1980’s. Monopolistic competition, 
increasing returns to scale and product differentiation in quality and variety is the 
crucial elements of this movement. 
2.2.3 Intra-Industry Trade and Environment 
Intra-industry trade and its effects on environment is a recent topic. Recently, there 
are many studies which focus on intra-industry trade and environment. 
Kayalica and Kayalica (2005) develop a two country - two firm model in which 
identical goods are produced and traded. They also consider the effects of 
transboundry pollution. Governments maximize national welfares by using the policy 
instruments which are import tariffs and consumption taxes. They show that a higher 
consumption tax in one country associates with a lower tariff in that country. They 
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also analyze the effects of revenue neutral reform and show that it increases 
consumption tax and reduces import tariffs. They find that changing tax structure is 
Pareto-improving. Therefore, non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is sub-optimal.  
Kayalica and Yilmaz (2006) construct a partial equilibrium model in order to analyze 
consumption based pollution externalities in a reciprocal dumping type of trade. In 
their model, agents, governments and firms placed in two countries, play a two stage 
non-cooperative game. Firstly, governments decide on their policy instruments, 
consumption tax and export subsidy levels. Secondly, firms choose their output 
levels. They show that removing subsidies does not effect pollution. Thus, free trade 
does not effect environment in this specified context. They also show that uniform 
taxing increases the consumption based pollution. 
Benarroch and Weder (2006) construct a two country model in order to investigate 
the relationship between intra-industry industry trade in intermediate products, 
pollution and increasing returns to scale. In their model, production occurs in two 
stages, intermediate and final good production. Monopolistic competition is the main 
characteristic of the intermediate good production and increasing returns to scale 
characterizes the final good production. There are polluting intermediate goods and 
pollution occurs if these goods are used in the final good production. Their goal is to 
show the effect of intermediate products on pollution. They figure out that 
international trade may cause lower pollution in the countries or may lead to lower 
pollution per unit of output at least in one country. 
Fung and Maechler (2007) build a price-setting duopoly model of intra-industry trade 
in order to obtain the effects of trade liberalization on environment. Their findings 
show that trade liberalization effects environment due to two factors. Firstly, the 
nature of pollution plays a crucial role on the impact of trade liberalization on 
environment. If the pollution occurs as transboundary pollution, then trade 
liberalization absolutely effect the dirty country positively since the environmental 
effect is positive for the dirty country. However, if the pollution is local, then the 
effect of trade liberalization on environment is negative. Therefore, the overall 
welfare effect is ambiguous. Secondly, the type of the country which opens its 
economy is an important factor. If the pollution occurs as transboundary pollution, 
then trade liberalization absolutely effect the dirty country positively since the 
environmental effect is positive for the dirty country. However, if the pollution is 
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local, then the effect of trade liberalization on environment is negative. Therefore, 
the overall welfare effect is ambiguous.  
Another interesting dimension of the relationship between intra-industry trade and 
environment is the awareness of the society about environment. Aidt (2005) analyses 
the intra-industry trade and environment relation by considering the environmental 
awareness of society. In his two country model, he defines three group of citizens 
who differ in their preferences between consumption goods and environmental 
quality. In this way, he incorporates environmental awareness into his model. It is 
suggested that an environmental awareness has two dimensions. Firstly, the type of 
pollution is very important. Transboundary pollution and local pollution have 
different impacts across the societies. Secondly, societies may care about the 
pollution in other countries. It is showed that if pollution has a transboundary nature 
or the society is concerned with the pollution in a local context, the rise in 
environmentalism reduces pollution. On the other hand,  if pollution is immobile and 
the society concerns with pollution in a global context, the rise in environmentalism 
may effect pollution positively or negatively.  
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3 CHAPTER 1: BEFORE TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
Our model is an intra industry type, two country-two firm model. Each country hosts 
one firm which produces homogenous good to be consumed in both countries. It is 
assumed that each country have different production technologies. The countries’ 
markets are segmented and firms face different demand conditions in each market. 
We assume linear inverse demand functions as follows.  
 ph = α - (xh + yh)   
 pf = α - (xf + yf)  
Countries are labeled with h (home) and f (foreign). Supply of home country’s firm 
is x. It produces xh for its domestic demand and xf for the foreign country’s demand. 
Supply of foreign country’ firm is y. It produces yh for home country’s demand and 
yf for its domestic demand. Firms face with different prices in each country 
distinguished with ph and pf. Since the markets are segmented, each firm takes other 
firm’s output decision for each market constant when deciding its own output. Total 
output of each firm is given with the following equation. 
 Di = xi + yi,  i = h, f   
Therefore we have the following profit functions for each firm. 
 pih = (ph − kh) xh + (pf − kh − τf ) xf    
 pif = (pf − kf) yf + (ph − kf − τh ) yh   
Profits of firm h and firm f are pih and pif. τi (i = h,f) is the import tariff levied on per 
unit of import. Marginal cost is ki (i = h,f) for each firm. Marginal cost structure of 
firms is given as follows. 
 kh = ch+ µ (θ – zh) 
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 kf = cf+ µ (θ – zf) 
Marginal cost structure is composed of two parts. First part (ci) is the production cost 
and second part (µ (θ – zi)) is the pollution abatement cost. Each government 
determines a quantity restriction per unit of output (zi, i = h, f) on the pollutants 
emitted. Therefore, firms have to abate the pollution in the amount of θ – zi where i= 
h, f  .θ is the gross pollution per unit of output. Thus, firms are subject to an 
abatement cost of µ(θ – zh) where µ is the abatement cost for per unit of output.  
The welfare of each country is composed of four parts, consumer surplus (CS), 
producer surplus (PS), import tariff revenue (ITR) and disutility of pollution (DP). 
Welfare of each country is given with the following equations. 
 Wh = CSh + PSh + ITRh - DPh 
 Wf = CSf + PSf + ITRf - DPf  
3.1 Non – Cooperation in Environmental Policy 
In this section, the non-cooperative solution of our model is examined. There is a 
three stage game between countries. At the first stage of our model, governments 
determine the pollution quota given the reaction functions of later stages. At the 
second stage, governments again determine the import tariffs given the reaction 
functions of later stage and the pollution quota determined. At the final stage, firms 
determine their output level given the results of earlier stages. The problem is solved 
with backwards induction method. There is an oligopolistic competition between 
firms and they wish to maximize their profits. Welfare maximization is the 
motivation of governments in this non-cooperative strategic game. 
3.1.1 Stage 3: Firms determine the output levels 
At the third stage of the game, each firm determines their output level taking reaction 
function of other firm as given. Firms give their decisions in a Cournot-Nash fashion. 
Since the markets are segmented, firms determine their output levels separately for 
each market. 
From the first order conditions we obtain the optimal output levels of the firms as 
follows: 
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 xh=1/3(cf -2ch+α-zfµ+2zhµ-θµ+τh) (3.1) 
 xf=1/3(cf-2ch+α-zfµ+2zhµ-θµ-2τf) (3.2) 
 yh=1/3(-2cf+ch+α+2zfµ-zhµ-θµ-2τh) (3.2) 
 yf=1/3(-2cf+ch+α+2zfµ-zhµ-θµ+τf) (3.4) 
second order conditions are directly satisfied.  
Comparative static analysis on the outcomes of stage 3 shows that due to any 
improvement in the foreign country’s production technologies which associates with 
a decrease in the marginal cost of firm f, firm h decreases the output level for both 
domestic and foreign market and firm f increases the output level for both domestic 
and foreign market. Any increase in demand associates with a higher output level for 
both firms. If foreign government increases the pollution quota, firm h decreases its 
output levels for both home and foreign market and firm f increases its output level 
for both home and foreign market. When the foreign government increases the 
import tariff, firm h decreases its output level for foreign market and firm f increases 
its output level for its own domestic market. However, the rise in import tariff of 
foreign government does not effect the output decisions of both firms for the home 
market. Due to any increase in the gross pollution occurs during the production of the 
good, both firms decrease their supply to both markets. These are the clear results 
that can be obtained by making comparative statics. However, the effect of any 
change in the unit cost of abating the pollution on the output decisions of firms is 
ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of the pollution quotas and gross pollution 
as it can be seen from equations below. 
 ∂xh/∂µ=1/3(-zf+2zh-θ) 
 ∂xf/∂µ=1/3(-zf+2zh-θ) 
 ∂yh/∂µ=1/3(2zf-zh-θ) 
 ∂yf/∂µ=1/3(2zf-zh-θ) 
18 
3.1.2 Stage 2: Governments determine the import tariffs  
At the second stage, governments determine the import tariffs in order to protect its 
domestic firm from international competition. Optimal level of import tariffs will be 
determined by the welfare maximizing behavior of governments.  
As mentioned before, welfare functions of countries are composed of four parts. 
These are consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS), import tariff revenues (ITR) 
and disutility from pollution (DP).  
 Wi = CSi + PSi + ITRi - DPi     ( i = h, f ) 
It is well known that differentiation of consumer surplus is as follows 
 dCSi = − Di dpi, i = h, f 
In order to analyze the optimal import tariff policies, equations (3.1) to (3.2) are 
substituted in the welfare functions and by totally differentiating we obtain the below 
results.  
 3 dWh = A1 dτh + A2 dτf 
 3 dWf = A2 dτf + A1 dτh 
where  
 A1 = (-cf-zh+α+zfµ-θµ-3τh) 
 A2 = (-ch-zf+α+zhµ-θµ-3τf) 
Since the system is symmetric between home and foreign country, all equilibrium 
values can be obtained through using the results of just one country. Results of other 
country are just the symmetric of our results.  
In order solve this system, we just equate A1 and A2 to zero and solve for the 
equilibrium values of τh and τf.  
τh = 1/3(-cf-zh+α+zfµ-θµ) 
τf = 1/3(-ch-zf+α+zhµ-θµ) 
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Second order conditions and stability conditions of this stage directly holds.
 
In 
accord with the expectations, results of comparative statics analysis are as follows. 
Due to any improvement in the production technologies of foreign country, home 
country increases the import tariff. Higher the pollution quota level of home country, 
lower the import tariff level of home country. Higher the demand, higher the import 
tariff levels. If gross pollution occurs during the production process increases, import 
tariff levels decreases. All these explanations are valid for foreign country, since the 
system is symmetric. In addition to these results, we have an ambiguous relationship 
between import tariff levels and pollution abatement technology. 
 
3.1.3 Stage 1: Governments determine the pollution quotas 
At the first stage, governments determine the pollution quotas in order to maximize 
their welfare. Firstly, we substitute the equilibrium values of stage two and three, 
which are the output decisions of firms and import tariff levels determined by the 
governments, into the welfare functions of countries. Secondly, totally differentiating 
the welfare function we obtain the following equations. 
 3 dWh = A3 dzh + A4 dzf 
 3 dWf = A4 dzf + A3 dzh 
where 
A3=1/81(ch(90-113µ)+cf(-45+51µ)+(-45+62µ)(α-θµ)+zf(-
18+(61-51µ)µ)+zh(9+µ(-180+113µ)))  
A4=1/81(cf(90-113µ)+ch(-45+51µ)+(-45+62µ)(α-θµ)+zh(-
18+(61-51µ)µ)+zf(9+µ(-180+113µ))) 
In order to find the optimal values of the pollution quotas determined by the welfare 
maximizing governments, we equate A3 and A4 to zero and solve for zh and zf. 
Results are as follows.   
Zh=(cf(-1215-1035µ+2782µ2)+α(1215-12519µ+22322µ2-
10168µ3)+µ(2ch(6777-12552µ+5084µ2)+θ(-1215+12519µ-
22322µ2+10168µ3)))/(-243-1044µ+28877µ2-34458µ3+10168µ4) 
20 
Zf=(ch(-1215-1035µ+2782µ2)+α(1215-12519µ+22322µ2-
10168µ3)+µ(2cf(6777-12552µ+5084µ2)+θ(-1215+12519µ-
22322µ2+10168µ3)))/(-243-1044µ+28877µ2-34458µ3+10168µ4) 
Now, by substituting the equilibrium values of zh and zf into the expressions obtained 
previously we have our final results. Thus, the formal framework of our analysis is 
completed. 
When we check the second order conditions and stability conditions of stage 1, our 
findings do not hold for every values of unit cost of pollution abatement, µ. Instead, 
our findings are valid for an interval which is a function of µ. Not for every case but 
for the non-cooperative case, stability conditions are not binding. The solution 
interval is determined by second order conditions. Thus, our model is valid between 
an upper and lower limit of µ schematized in the below identity. 
µ1 < µ < µ2 
Above, µ1 is the lower limit and µ2 is the upper limit of µ.  Our finding from second 
order conditions plays a crucial role in our comparative statics analysis.  
3.1.4 Comparative Statics 
Effect of gross pollution on the policy arguments 
As mentioned before gross pollution is the maximum amount of pollution that occurs 
during the production of goods. First degree derivatives of policy arguments with 
respect to gross pollution show the effect of changes in gross pollution on policy 
arguments of governments. Results are as follows.  
∂zi/∂θ=(µ(-1215+12519µ-22322µ2+10168µ3))/(-243-
1044µ+28877µ2-34458µ3+10168µ4) 
Derivative of zi, with respect to θ is a function of µ, unit cost of abating the pollution. 
When we analyze the sign of this expression in the interval where second order 
conditions hold, we find that this expression changes sign at a critical value of µ. 
From second order conditions the higher limit and lower limit of µ has been obtained 
and we have labeled the lower limit with µ1 and higher limit with µ2. Let’s label the 
critical level of µ with µc.  
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Holding the second order conditions, when µ is smaller than µc, ∂zi/∂θ is positive 
and when µ is higher than µc, ∂zi/∂θ is negative. The reason can be explained by 
examining the components of welfare functions. Holding everything else constant, 
when gross pollution increases, firms have to incur higher costs since they have to 
abate more pollution. Therefore, producer surplus will be affected negatively from an 
increase in gross pollution. Secondly, amount of the goods consumed will decrease 
due to the decrease in supply. Thus, consumer surplus will be affected negatively, 
too. Thirdly, import tariff revenue decreases since the amount of production for 
import will also decrease. However, disutility of pollution decreases due to the 
decrease in output levels. Thus, an increase in gross pollution has both negative and 
positive effects on welfare. It can be said that when the unit cost of abating the 
pollution is sufficiently low, that is firms are efficient in abating the pollution, 
governments prefer to choose higher level of pollution quota due to an increase in 
gross pollution. The reason is that, in this case the gains from consumer surplus, 
production surplus and import tariff revenue surpass the loss from increase in 
pollution. The crucial points are those firms are efficient in abating the pollution and 
gross pollution has contrasting effects on the components of welfare function. 
The effect of an increase in gross pollution on the pollution quota determined by 
governments when unit cost of abatement is above the critical level can also be 
explained in the same way. In this case firms are inefficient in abating the pollution. 
Thus, any increase in pollution quota has severe effects on the welfare through the 
disutility of pollution quota. Therefore, governments respond to an increase in gross 
pollution by lowering the pollution quotas. That is the welfare gains from abating the 
pollution surpass the gains from consumer surplus, production surplus and import 
tariff revenue, if the firms are inefficient in abatement technology.  
In order to analyze the effects of changes in gross pollution on import tariffs, we take 
the derivative of import tariff with respect to gross pollution. It is a function of unit 
cost of abatement as it can be seen in the equation below.  
∂τi/∂θ =(2µ(9+2µ))/(-9+µ(-119+62µ)) 
Inside the interval determined by second order conditions, ∂τi/∂θ is strictly positive. 
Holding the second order conditions, due to any increase in gross pollution, 
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governments determine higher import tariff levels. That is, it is beneficial for the 
governments to increase the import tariffs due to an increase in gross pollution, since 
welfare gains from abating the pollution surpass the gains from consumer surplus, 
producer surplus and import tariffs. 
The effect of changes in demand on policy arguments 
First degree derivatives of policy arguments with respect to demand parameter, α, 
inform what the direction of the change in the policy arguments is due to infinitely 
small change in demand. The derivative of pollution quota with respect to demand is 
as follows.  
∂zi/∂α=(1215-12519µ+22322µ2-10168µ3)/(-243-1044µ+28877µ2-
34458µ3+10168µ4) 
Derivative of zi, pollution quota, with respect to α, demand, is a function of µ, unit 
cost of abating the pollution. Again, there is a critical level of µ where this 
expression changes sign. We have labeled the critical level of µ with µc. µc, where 
∂zi/∂α changes sign is exactly the same with µc where ∂zi/∂θ changes sign.  
Holding the second order conditions, ∂zi/∂α is positive if µ is higher than µc and 
∂zi/∂α is negative if µ is lower than µc. Holding everything else constant, when 
demand increases, firms will supply more goods. Therefore, producer surplus will be 
affected positively from an increase in demand. Secondly, it is clear that consumer 
surplus will be affected positively. Thirdly, import tariff revenue increases since the 
amount of production for import will also increase. However, disutility of pollution 
increases due to the increase in output levels. Thus, an increase in demand has both 
negative and positive effects on pollution. It can be said that when the unit cost of 
abating the pollution is sufficiently low, that is firms are efficient in abating the 
pollution, governments prefer to choose lower level of pollution quota due to an 
increase in demand. The reason is that, in this case the gains from consumer surplus, 
production surplus and import tariff revenue can not surpass the loss from increase in 
pollution. The crucial points are those firms are efficient in abating the pollution and 
demand has contrasting effects on the components of welfare function. 
The effect of an increase in demand on the pollution quota determined by 
governments when unit cost of abatement is above the critical level can also be 
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explained in the same way. In this case firms are inefficient in abating the pollution. 
Thus, any increase in demand has severe effects on the welfare through the disutility 
of pollution quota. Therefore, governments respond to an increase in gross pollution 
by lowering the pollution quotas. That is the welfare gains from abating the pollution 
surpass the gains from consumer surplus, production surplus and import tariff 
revenue, if the firms are in efficient in abatement technology.  
In order to analyze the effects of changes in demand on import tariffs, we take the 
derivative of import tariff with respect to gross pollution. As it can be seen from the 
equation below, it is a function of unit cost of abatement.  
∂τi/∂α = -(2(9+2µ))/(-9+µ(-119+62µ)) 
Inside the interval determined by second-order conditions, the sign ∂τi/∂α is strictly 
positive. Holding the second order conditions, due to any increase in demand, 
governments determine higher import tariff levels. That is, it is beneficial for the 
governments to increase the import tariffs due to an increase in demand, since 
welfare gains from abating the pollution surpass the gains from consumer surplus, 
producer surplus in import tariff revenue. 
3.2 Cooperative Solution 
In this section, the cooperative solution of our model is examined. It is a three stage 
game between countries. Different from the previous section, governments determine 
a unique pollution quota cooperatively at the first stage of the game. The rest of the 
game is the same with the previous section. Since the problem is solved with 
backwards induction method, solutions to the third and second stages are exactly the 
same. Therefore, only the first stage of the game will be examined. 
3.2.1 Stage 1: Governments determine a unique pollution quota cooperation 
At second stage governments determine the import tariffs in order to maximize their 
individual welfare. At the first stage, governments determine a unique pollution 
quota in order to maximize the total welfare which is the sum of their individual 
welfare. Firstly, we substitute the equilibrium values of stage two and three, which 
are the output decisions of firms and import tariff levels determined by the 
governments, into the welfare functions of countries. Then we add the sum of these 
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welfare functions. By totally differentiating the total welfare function we obtain the 
following results. 
dWT= 1/81(cf(41-65µ)+ch(41-65µ)+2(z(1+5µ)(-19+13µ)+(-
41+65µ)(α-θµ)))dz 
In order to find the optimal values of the pollution quota determined, we equate 
coefficient of z to zero and solve for z. Results are as follows.   
z=((-41+65µ)(cf+ch-2α+2θµ))/(2(-19-82µ+65µ2)) 
Now by substituting the equilibrium values of z into total welfare function, we have 
our final results.  
When we check the second order conditions and stability conditions of stage 1, our 
findings does not hold for every values of unit cost of pollution abatement, µ. The 
solution interval is determined by second order conditions. Thus, our model is valid 
between an upper and lower limit of µ schematized as below identity. 
µ1 < µ < µ2 
Our finding from second order conditions plays a crucial role in our comparative 
statics analysis. Differently from the non-cooperative case, cooperative solution 
allows us to make comparative statics analysis for other parameters of the model.  
3.2.2 Comparative Statics 
Since the explanation of our findings from the comparative statics analysis is the 
same with the non-cooperative case, we will only present our findings.  
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Table 3.1. Results of Comparative Statics for Cooperation Case 
  
z τh τf 
µ < µc µ > µc µ < µc µ > µc µ < µc µ >µc 
ch + -     - - 
cf + - - -     
α - + + + + + 
θ + - - - - - 
 
The comparative statics analysis results of the cooperative case are presented in table 
1. Each cell shows the sign of derivative of an exogenous variable in the columns 
with respect to the parameters in the rows for unit cost of abatement both below and 
above a critical level. The comparative statics analysis of the policy parameters with 
respect to demand and gross pollution has been done in the non-cooperative case. 
Since there is no difference in their interpretations, it will not be examined again in 
depth. Similar to the non-cooperative case, the pollution quota determined 
cooperatively changes in the same direction with the gross pollution due to a change 
in the gross pollution for small values of unit cost of abatement. However, it changes 
in the opposite direction with gross pollution due to a change in gross pollution for 
large values of unit cost of abatement. Different from the non-cooperative case, due 
to a change in gross pollution, import tariffs changes strictly in the opposite 
direction. Effect of the change in the demand or gross pollution on the components of 
the welfare is the reason of this fact. When gross pollution or demand changes, the 
components of welfare change in different direction. In the interval determined by 
second order conditions, the outcome of the negative and positive effects on welfare 
determines the direction of the change in policy arguments due to the change in 
parameters of the model. 
In the cooperative case, we obtain some results from the comparative statics analysis 
of policy arguments due to a change in production technology.  
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Effect of production Technology on Policy arguments 
First degree derivatives of policy arguments with respect to marginal costs of firms, 
ch and cf, show the effect of infinitely small changes in production technology on 
policy arguments of governments. Results are as follows.  
∂z/∂ci=(-41+65 µ)/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2)) 
Derivative of z, pollution quota determined by governments cooperatively, with 
respect to ci, marginal cost of production, is a function of µ, unit cost of abating the 
pollution. When we analyze the sign of this expression in the interval where second 
order conditions hold, we find that this expression changes sign at µc.  
Holding the second order conditions, when µ is smaller than µc, ∂z/∂ci is positive 
and when µ is higher than µc, ∂z/∂ci is negative. The reason can be explained as 
follows. Holding everything else constant, due to an improvement in production 
technology, firms supply more. Therefore, producer surplus will be affected 
positively from an improvement in production technology. That is producer surplus 
will increase due a decrease in marginal cost of production. Secondly, amount of the 
goods consumed will increase due to the decrease in supply. Thus, consumer surplus 
will increase, too. Thirdly, import tariff revenue increases since the amount of 
production for import will also increase. However, disutility of pollution increases 
due to the increase in output levels. Thus, an improvement in production technology 
has both negative and positive effects on pollution. It can be said that when the unit 
cost of abating the pollution is sufficiently low, that is firms are efficient in abating 
the pollution, governments prefer to choose lower level of pollution quota due to an 
improvement in production technology. The reason is that, in this case the gains from 
consumer surplus, production surplus and import tariff revenue can not surpass the 
loss from increase in pollution. The crucial points are those firms are efficient in 
abating the pollution and gross pollution has contrasting effects on the components 
of welfare function. 
The effect of an improvement in production technology on the pollution quota 
determined by governments cooperatively, when unit cost of abatement is above the 
critical level can also be explained in the same way. In this case firms are inefficient 
in abating the pollution 
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3.3 Comparison Between Non-Cooperation and Cooperation 
Until now, in the cooperation and non-cooperation case, we have got the values of 
policy arguments; pollution quotas and import tariffs. In this stage we will compare 
these results.  
Values of policy arguments are a function of demand, production technologies of 
firms, pollution abatement technology and gross pollution as it is illustrated below. 
τh
nc
 = f(α,ch,cf,µ,θ) 
τf
nc
 = f(α,ch,cf,µ,θ) 
Zhnc= f(α,ch,cf,µ,θ) 
Zfnc= f(α,ch,cf, µ,θ) 
τh
c
 = f(α,ch,cf, µ,θ ) 
τf
c
 = f(α,ch,cf, µ,θ) 
Zc= f(α,ch,cf, µ,θ) 
In order to indicate the non-cooperative case, values of policy arguments are labeled 
with nc. For the cooperative case, values of policy arguments are labeled with c.  
Firstly, pollution quotas will be compared. In order to compare the pollution quotas 
determined by governments in the non-cooperative and cooperative case, we obtain 
the difference of these values. The differences are equal to individual pollution 
quotas minus the unique pollution quota determined cooperatvely. As it is illustrated 
below, the difference is a function of demand, production technologies of firms, 
pollution abatement technology and gross pollution. 
∆zh = f(α,ch,cf, µ,θ) 
∆zf = f(α,ch,cf, µ,θ) 
Thus, in order to investigate the relationship between ∆z, µ, cf and ch; we will give 
values to α and θ. While attending values to α and θ, we know that µ changes in an 
28 
interval determined by second order conditions. Also the values we attend must 
provide the positive output conditions. It is safe to attend 100 to α. By considering 
the positive output conditions, we can choose 70 for θ. It can be showed that our 
results will not be affected from the values attended to α and θ. Finally, we will 
construct two scenarios making assumptions about the production technologies of 
firms to investigate how ∆z changes with µ. In the first scenario, it will be assumed 
that firms have the same production technology. That is ch is equal to cf and  both 
are 1. 
In the scenario, ch and cf is taken as 1. In the graph below, it can be seen that ∆zh 
and ∆zf are negative when pollution abatement technology is efficient. That is the 
unique pollution quota determined cooperatively by both governments is higher than 
the pollution quotas determined individually by the governmnets. As abatemment 
technology became more inefficient, ∆zh and ∆zf get smaller since the unique 
pollution quota determined cooperatively became smaller. After a critical value of 
µ, ∆zh and ∆zf are positive where pollution abatement technology is inefficient. 
That is the unique pollution quota determined cooperatively by both governments is 
lower than the pollution quotas determined individually by the governmnets. 
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Figure 3.1. Change of Difference of Pollution Quotas with Unit Cost of Abatement – Scenario 1 
The reason can be explained as follows. As it was discussed in previous sections, the 
welfare function of countries is composed of production surplus, consumer surplus, 
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import tariffs and disutility of pollution. Welfare increases through the first three 
elements when production increases. However, welfare decreases through the 
distutility of pollution when production increases. Thus, there are two opposite effect 
of changing the production level. In our scenarios there are two crucial variables; 
abatement technology and production technology. More efficient the firms in 
production technology, more willingness the governments to increase their welfare 
through production surplus, consumer surplus and import tariffs by increasing 
production. The second crucial variable is abatement technology. More efficient the 
firms in abatement technology, more willingness the governments to increase welfare 
through decreasing disutility of pollution by decreasing production level.  In this 
respect, it is advantageous for firms to increase welfare through disutility of pollution 
by decreasing production level when pollution abatement technology is inefficient.. 
Thus, when pollution abatement technology is inefficient, governments prefer to 
increase pollution quota by cooperation.  
Secondly, if firms are efficient in abatement technology, governments behave in the 
opposite way. In this case, firms are efficient in abatement technology. Efficiency in 
abatement technology let the governments to increase production level.  
In the second scenario, it will be assumed that domestic firm is efficient relative to 
foreign firm. In this scenario ch will stay 1 and cf will be taken 2. In the graph below, 
it can be seen that ∆zh and ∆zf are negative. That is the unique pollution quota 
determined cooperatively by both governments is higher than the pollution quotas 
determined individually by the governmnets. Only there is a small interval of 
 µ where ∆zf is positive.  
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Figure 3.2. Change of Difference of Pollution Quotas with Unit Cost of Abatement – Scenario 2 
 
When we analyze the graph above, it can be realized that how level of production 
technology effects the environmental policies of governments. When production 
technology is efficient governments have an incentive to increase pollution quotas to 
increase welfare through producer surplus, consumer surplus and import tariff 
revenues. On the other hand, when production technology is relatively inefficient 
firm has an incentive to increase welfare by decreasing disutility of pollution. In the 
graph, it can be seen that when pollution abatement technology is efficint firms 
prefers to increase pollution quota by cooperation in order to increase their welfare 
through disutility of pollution. As pollution abatement technology became inefficient 
they prefer to determine lower pollution quotas by cooperation. In addition, relative 
efficiency in production technology of domestic firm let the home government to 
determine a higher pollution quota in the non-cooperation case to take the advantage 
of its relative efficiency in production technology. That is in an interval of µ where 
pollution abatement technology is efficient, domestic firm determine a higher 
pollution quota non-cooperatively. However, ∆zf responds more strongly than ∆zh 
to the changes in µ.  The reason can be explained as follows. We have showed that 
improvement in abatement technology let the governments to have higher pollution 
quotas. Also, higher efficiency in production technology lets the governments to 
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determine higher pollution quotas. Therefore, for ecery valid value of  µ , domestic 
government has an higher incentive to have higher pollution quota with respect to 
foreign government. Thus, improvement in abatement technology effects the 
domestic firm incentive to increase pollution quota less than the foreign government. 
So, as µ increase domestic government’s pollution quota determined non-
cooperatively doesn’t grow as much as the foreign government’s pollution quota. 
Thus, as it can be see in the graph, after a critical value of µ, ∆zh is higher than ∆zf. 
That is in this region home government determines a lower pollution quota than 
foreign government. 
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4 CHAPTER 2: FREE TRADE  
In this chapter, effects of trade liberalization on the policy arguments of governments 
will be examined. With trade liberalization, governments give up the import tariffs 
levied on the imports. In order to extend the model to free trade case, import tariffs 
are taken zero and all the terms including import tariffs drop off the relevant 
expressions. In preceding sections, free trade case will be examined for both non-
cooperative and cooperative case. Then, they will be compared. Secondly, results of 
main model and free trade case will be compared.  Differently from previous section, 
profit functions of firms do not include import tariff term. Therefore we have the 
following profit functions for each firm. 
 pih = (ph − kh) xh + (pf − kh  ) xf     (4) 
 pif = (pf − kf) yf + (ph − kf  ) yh     (5) 
Also, welfare functions do not include import tariff term. The welfare of each 
country is composed of three parts; consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS) 
and disutility of pollution (DP). Welfare of each country are given with the following 
equations. 
 Wh = CSh + PSh - DPh (8) 
 Wf = CSf + PSf - DPf  (9) 
4.1 Non – Cooperation in Environmental Policy 
In this section, non-cooperative solution of free trade extension of our model is 
examined. Since import tariffs are abandoned, the model is consist of two stage 
game. At the first stage, governments determine the pollution quota given the 
reaction functions of later stages. At the second stage, firms determine their output 
level given the results of earlier stages.  
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4.1.1 Stage 2: Firms determines the output levels 
At the second stage of the game, each firm determines their output level taking 
reaction function of other firm as given. The first order conditions obtain the optimal 
output levels of the firms. 
 xh= 1/3(cf-2ch+α-zfµ+2zhµ-θµ) (4.1) 
 xf= 1/3(cf-2ch+α-zfµ+2zhµ-θµ) (4.2) 
 yh= 1/3(-2cf+ch+α+2zfµ-zhµ-θµ) (4.3) 
 yf= 1/3(-2cf+ch+α+2zfµ-zhµ-θµ) (4.4) 
Thus, there is a two way trade between these countries. In the problem, second order 
conditions are directly satisfied.  
Since comparative static analysis on the outcomes of stage 2 is parallel with the stage 
3 of the main model, they won’t be examined again.   
4.1.2 Stage 1: Governments determine the pollution quotas 
At the first stage, governments determine the pollution quotas in order to maximize 
their welfare. Firstly, we substitute the equilibrium values of stage one, which are the 
output decisions of firms into the welfare functions of countries. Secondly, first 
degree derivative of Wh with respect to zh and Wf with respect to zf are equated to 
zero. Expressions obtained are as follows: 
1/9(-6(cf-2ch+α)+(7cf-17ch+6zf-24zh+10α+6θ)µ+(-7zf+17zh-10θ)µ2)= 0 
1/9(-6(ch+α)+cf(12-17µ)+µ(7ch+6zh+10α+6θ-7zhµ-10θµ+zf(-24+17µ)))= 0 
In order to find the optimal values of the pollution quotas determined by the welfare 
maximizing governments, above equations are solved for zh and zf simultaneously. 
Values obtained are as follows:   
Zh=(cf(-6+7µ)+ch(21-44µ+20µ2)-(α-θµ)(15-37µ+20µ2))/(µ(45-61µ+20µ2)) 
Zf=(ch(-6+7µ)+cf(21-44µ+20µ2)-(α-θµ)(15-37µ+20µ2))/(µ(45-61µ+20µ2)) 
Now by substituting the equilibrium values of zh and zf into the expressions obtained, 
we have our final results. Thus, the formal framework of our analysis is completed. 
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Again our solutions are valid for an interval of pollution abatement technology 
determined by second order conditions. 
4.1.3 Comparative Statics 
Our findings from comparative statics analysis are presented in the below table. 
Explanation of our findings is not different from previous sections, so we are 
yetinmek with presenting our results.  
Table 4.1. Results of Comparative Statics for Non-cooperation Case 
 After-liberalization 
 
zh 
µ < µc µ > µc 
ch + - 
cf - + 
α - + 
θ + - 
 
Each cell shows the sign of derivative of zh in the columns with respect to the 
parameters in the rows for unit cost of abatement both below and above a critical 
level. If pollution abatement technology is efficient, pollution quota of home country 
increases due to any improvement in production technology of home firm and 
decreases due to any improvement in the production technology of foreign firm. If 
pollution abatement technology is not efficient, pollution quota of home country 
decreases due to any improvement in production technology of home firm and 
increases due to any improvement in the production technology of foreign firm The 
pollution quota changes in the same direction with the gross pollution due to a 
change in the gross pollution for small values of unit cost of abatement. However, it 
changes in the opposite direction with gross pollution due to a change in gross 
pollution for large values of unit cost of abatement. Secondly, for low values of unit 
cost of pollution abatement, pollution quota decreases as demand increases, however 
for high values of unit cost of pollution abatement, pollution quota increases as 
demand increases. Effect of the change in the demand or gross pollution on the 
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components of the welfare is the reason of this fact. When gross pollution or demand 
changes, the components of welfare change in different direction. In the interval 
determined by second order conditions, the outcome of the negative and positive 
effects on welfare determines the direction of the change in policy arguments due to 
the change in parameters of the model.  
4.2 Cooperation in Environmental Policy 
In this section, the cooperative solution of our extended model is examined. There is 
a two stage game between countries. Differently from the previous section, now, 
governments determine a unique pollution quota cooperatively at the first stage of 
the game. The rest of the game is the same with the previous section. Since the 
problem is solved with backwards induction method, solution to the second stages 
are exactly the same. Therefore, only the first stage of the game will be examined. 
4.2.1 Stage 1: Governments determine a unique pollution quota  
At the first stage, governments determine a unique pollution quota in order to 
maximize the total welfare which is the sum of their individual welfare. Firstly, we 
substitute the equilibrium values of stage two, which is the output decisions of firms 
into the welfare functions of countries. Then we add the sum of these welfare 
functions. By totally differentiating the total welfare function we obtain the 
following results. 
dWT= 1/9(6(cf+ch-2α)-4(2(cf+ch+3z-2α)-3θ)µ+16(z-θ)µ2)dz 
In order to find the optimal values of the pollution quota determined, we equate 
coefficient of dz to zero and solve for z. Results are as follows.   
z=((-3+4µ)(cf+ch-2α+2θµ))/(4µ(-3+2µ)) 
Now by substituting the equilibrium values of z into total welfare function, we have 
our final results.  
When we check the second order conditions and stability conditions of stage 1, our 
findings does not hold for every values of unit cost of pollution abatement, µ. The 
solution interval is determined by second order conditions. Thus, our model is valid 
between an upper and lower limit of µ. 
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4.2.2 Comparative Statics 
Since the explanation of our findings from the comparative statics analysis is the 
same with the non-cooperative case, we will only present our findings.  
Table 4.2. Results of Comparative Statics for Cooperation Case 
 After-liberalization 
  
z 
µ < µc µ > µc 
ch + - 
cf + - 
α - + 
θ + - 
 
Each cell shows the sign of derivative of zh in the columns with respect to the 
parameters in the rows for unit cost of abatement both below and above a critical 
level. If pollution abatement technology is efficient, pollution quota of home country 
increases due to any improvement in production technology of home firm and 
foreign firm. If pollution abatement technology is not efficient, pollution quota of 
home country decreases due to any improvement in production technology of home 
firm and foreign firm the pollution quota changes in the same direction with the 
gross pollution due to a change in the gross pollution for small values of unit cost of 
abatement. However, it changes in the opposite direction with gross pollution due to 
a change in gross pollution for large values of unit cost of abatement. Secondly, for 
low values of unit cost of pollution abatement, pollution quota decreases as demand 
increases, however for high values of unit cost of pollution abatement, pollution 
quota increases as demand increases. Effect of the change in the demand or gross 
pollution on the components of the welfare is the reason of this fact. When gross 
pollution or demand changes, the components of welfare change in different 
direction. In the interval determined by second order conditions, the outcome of the 
negative and positive effects on welfare determines the direction of the change in 
policy arguments due to the change in parameters of the model.  
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4.3 Comparison Between Non-Cooperation and Cooperation 
Up to now, in the cooperation and non-cooperation case, we have got the values of 
policy arguments; pollution quotas and import tariffs. In this stage we will compare 
these results.  
Values of policy arguments are a function of demand, production technologies of 
firms, pollution abatement technology and gross pollution as it is illustrated below. 
Zhnc= f(α,ch,cf,µ,θ) 
Zfnc= f(α,ch,cf, µ,θ) 
Zc= f(α,ch,cf, µ,θ) 
In order to indicate the non-cooperative case, values of policy arguments are labeled 
with nc. For the cooperative case, values of policy arguments are labeled with c.  
In order to compare the pollution quotas determined by governments in the non-
cooperative and cooperative case, we obtain the difference of these values. As it is 
illustrated below, the difference is a function of demand, production technologies of 
firms, pollution abatement technology and gross pollution. 
∆zh = f(α,ch,cf, µ,θ) 
∆zf = f(α,ch,cf, µ,θ) 
Thus, in order to investigate the relationship between ∆z, µ, cf and ch; we will give 
values to α and θ. While attending values to α and θ, we know that µ changes in an 
interval determined by second order conditions. Also the values we attend must 
provide the positive output conditions. It is safe to attend 100 to α. By considering 
the positive output conditions, we can choose 70 for θ. It can be showed that our 
results will not be affected from the values attended to α and θ. Finally, we will 
construct two scenarios making assumptions about the production technologies of 
firms to investigate how ∆z changes with µ. In the first scenario, it will be assumed 
that firms have the same production technology. That is ch is equal to cf and  both 
are 1. 
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In the scenario, ch and cf is taken as 1. In the graph below, it can be seen that ∆zh 
and ∆zf are negative. That is the unique pollution quota determined cooperatively by 
both governments is higher than the pollution quotas determined individually by the 
governmnets.  
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Figure 4.1. Change of Differences of Polllution Quotas with Unit Cost of Abatement – Scenario1 
 
The reason can be explained as follows. As it was discussed in previous sections, the 
welfare function of countries is composed of production surplus, consumer surplus, 
import tariffs and disutility of pollution. Welfare increases through the first three 
elements when production increases. However, welfare decreases through the 
distutility of pollution when production increases. Thus, there are two opposite effect 
of changing the production level. In our scenarios there are two crucial variables; 
abatement technology and production technology. More efficient the firms in 
production technology, more willingness the governments to increase their welfare 
through production surplus, consumer surplus and import tariffs by increasing 
production. The second crucial variable is abatement technology. More efficient the 
firms in abatement technology, more willingness the governments to increase welfare 
through decreasing disutility of pollution by decreasing production level.  In this 
respect, it is advantageous for firms to increase welfare through disutility of pollution 
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by decreasing production level when pollution abatement technology is inefficient.. 
Thus, when pollution abatement technology is inefficient, governments prefer to 
increase pollution quota by cooperation.  
Secondly, if firms are efficient in abatement technology, governments behave in the 
opposite way. In this case, firms are efficient in abatement technology. Efficiency in 
abatement technology let the governments to increase production level.  
In the second scenario, it will be assumed that domestic firm is efficient relative to 
foreign firm. In this scenario ch will stay 1 and cf will be taken 2. In the graph below, 
it can be seen that ∆zh and ∆zf are negative. That is the unique pollution quota 
determined cooperatively by both governments is higher than the pollution quotas 
determined individually by the governmnets. Only there is a small interval of 
 µ where ∆zf is positive.  
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Figure 4.2. Change of Differences of Polllution Quotas with Unit Cost of Abatement – Scenario2 
 
When we analyze the graph above, it can be realized that how level of production 
technology effects the environmental policies of governments. When production 
technology is efficient governments have an incentive to increase pollution quotas to 
increase welfare through producer surplus, consumer surplus and import tariff 
revenues. On the other hand, when production technology is relatively inefficient 
firm has an incentive to increase welfare by decreasing disutility of pollution. In the 
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graph, it can be seen that when pollution abatement technology is efficint firms 
prefers to increase pollution quota by cooperation in order to increase their welfare 
through disutility of pollution. As pollution abatement technology became inefficient 
they prefer to determine lower pollution quotas by cooperation. In addition, relative 
efficiency in production technology of domestic firm let the home government to 
determine a higher pollution quota in the non-cooperation case to take the advantage 
of its relative efficiency in production technology. That is in an interval of µ where 
pollution abatement technology is efficient, domestic firm determine a higher 
pollution quota non-cooperatively. However, ∆zf responds more strongly than ∆zh 
to the changes in µ.  The reason can be explained as follows. We have showed that 
improvement in abatement technology let the governments to have higher pollution 
quotas. Also, higher efficiency in production technology lets the governments to 
determine higher pollution quotas. Therefore, for ecery valid value of  µ , domestic 
government has an higher incentive to have higher pollution quota with respect to 
foreign government. Thus, improvement in abatement technology effects the 
domestic firm incentive to increase pollution quota less than the foreign government. 
So, as µ increase domestic government’s pollution quota determined non-
cooperatively doesn’t grow as much as the foreign government’s pollution quota. 
Thus, as it can be see in the graph, after a critical value of µ, ∆zh is higher than ∆zf. 
That is in this region home government determines a lower pollution quota than 
foreign government. 
4.4 Comparison Between Before and After Trade Liberalization 
In this section we will examine how trade liberalization effects the values pollution 
quotas. Analysis is done for both cases, non-cooperative and cooperative case. We 
use the scenarios used in the previous sections.  
We will use the same scenarios used in previous sections. α is taken 100 and θ is 70. 
The interval of µ is cross section of the intervals in the non-cooperative cases of after 
liberalization and before liberalization cases. We take the differences for both home 
and foreign countries pollution quotas determined non-cooperatively before and after 
liberalization. These operations are summarized as below. 
∆zhnc = zhnc-b– zhnc-a 
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∆zfnc = zfnc-b– zfnc-a 
 
Above, nc indicates that all values are belong to non-cooperative cases. In order to 
indicate the before and after liberalization cases, b and a are used. ∆zhnc is the 
difference between the pollution quotas of home country determined non-
cooperatively before and after liberalization.  ∆zfnc is the difference between the 
pollution quotas of home country determined non-cooperatively before and after 
liberalization. Below graph shows how these differences change between the lower 
and upper limit of µ.  
In the first scenario home firm and foreign firm have the smae efficiency in 
production technology and the marginal cost of production is taken 1.  
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Figure 4.3. Change of Differences of Pollution Quotas with Unit Cost of Abatement Before and After 
Liberalizing Trade in Non-cooperation Case-Scenario 1 
As it can be seen from the graph ∆zhnc and ∆zfnc is always negative. Thus trade 
liberalization let the firms to increase their pollution quota. The reason is that 
liberalizing trade increases volume of trade. Thus, firms produce mor for both 
domestic and foreign market. Therefore, governments prefer to increase their welfare 
through increasing producer surplus, concumer surplus and import tarif revenues. 
In the second scenario home firm is efficient in production technology and its 
marginal cost of production is taken 1. Foreign firm is inefficient in production 
technology and its marginal cost of production is taken 5. 
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Figure 4.4. Change of Differences of Pollution Quotas with Unit Cost of Abatement Before and After 
Liberalizing Trade in Non-cooperation Case-Scenario 2 
As it can be seen from the graph ∆zhnc and ∆zfnc is always negative. Thus trade 
liberalization let the firms to increase their pollution quota. The reason is that 
liberalizing trade increases volume of trade. Thus, firms produce mor for both 
domestic and foreign market. Therefore, governments prefer to increase their welfare 
through increasing producer surplus, concumer surplus and import tarif revenues. 
Secondly, it is seen that  ∆zhnc higher than is always higher than ∆zfnc. The reason is 
obvious. Import tariff is a way to protect domestic firms from international 
competition. When trade is liberalized, foreign firm worse of in terms of 
international competition, since it is inefficient in production technology. Thus, 
foreign government can not be as willingness as the domestic government to increase 
pollution quota. That is, foreign government is always more inclined to keep 
pollution at a lower level. On the other hand domestic government increases 
pollution in order to benefit from the domestic firm’s competitive advantage in 
production technologies.   
Secondly, we will analyze the difference of pollution quotas determined 
cooperatively before and after liberalization.  
∆zc = zc-b– zc-a 
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z
c-b
 is the pollution quota determined cooperatively before liberalization and zc-a is 
the pollution quota determined cooperatively after liberalization. The difference is 
denoted with ∆zc. Below the graph shows how ∆zc changes in the valid interval of µ. 
In the first scenario home firm and foreign firm have the smae efficiency in 
production technology and the marginal cost of production is taken 1.  
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Figure 4.5. Change of Differences of Pollution Quotas with Unit Cost of Abatement Before and After 
Liberalizing Trade in Cooperation Case – Scenario 1 
As it can be seen in the graph above pollution quota determined cooperatively 
decreases with trade liberalization for all values of unit cost of abatement.  
In the second scenario home firm is efficient in production technology and its 
marginal cost of production is taken 1. Foreign firm is inefficient in production 
technology and its marginal cost of production is taken 5. 
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Figure 4.5. Change of Differences of Pollution Quotas with Unit Cost of Abatement Before and After 
Liberalizing Trade in Cooperation Case – Scenario 2 
As it can be seen in the graph above, again, pollution quota determined cooperatively 
decreases with trade liberalization for all values of unit cost of abatement.  
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5 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, our main objective was to study how governments form their 
environmental policies if intra-industry trade is their main type of trade. In order to 
study the effects of pollution abatement technology on environmental policies, we 
incorporate a marginal cost structure consisting of two parts. While, first part is 
related with production technology, second part is related with pollution abatement 
technology. This marginal cost structure allowed us to examine how environmental 
policies are related to pollution abatement technology.  
In order to investigate this relationship we constructed an intra-industry type two 
country-two firm partial equilibrium model. In the model, agents maximize their 
objective functions through a three-stage game. At the firs stage, governments make 
their environmental policies by putting pollution quotas on production, in order to 
maximize national welfare. Secondly, again governments make their international 
trade policies by levying import tariffs in order to maximize national welfare. At the 
third stage, firms determine output levels for both domestic and foreign market. In 
the free trade extension of our model, the game consists of two stages, since import 
tariffs are excluded.  
We solved the before-liberalization case for two scenarios, non-cooperation and 
cooperation environmental policy. When governments are determining pollution 
quotas non-cooperatively, each government maximizes its own welfare. When they 
cooperate, they determine a unique pollution quota by maximizing total welfare 
which is the sum of individual welfares of countries. Comparative statics analysis for 
both non-cooperation and cooperation cases revealed the importance of pollution 
abatement technology on policy making. When governments are changing the 
environmental and international trade policies due to a structural change such as 
change in production costs, demand and gross pollution, they have to consider the 
opposite effects on welfare. While welfare is affected positively from producer 
surplus, consumer surplus and import tariffs if production level rises, it is affected 
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positively from disutility of pollution if production level decreases. Pollution 
abatement technology plays its key role at this point. If pollution abatement 
technology is efficient, governments prefers to increase output level by making 
policies in respond to structural changes. The reason is that effective pollution 
abatement technology allows governments to increase pollution quota without 
causing severe environmental damage. This means they prefer to increase welfare via 
production surplus, consumer surplus and import tariffs. On the other hand, if 
pollution abatement technology is not efficient, governments prefer to decrease 
production level in order avoid severe environmental problems. That is while 
maximizing the welfare; they prefer to decrease pollution rather than increasing the 
production surplus, consumer surplus and import tariffs. We have reached the same 
results while analyzing the cooperation case.  
In the before-liberalization case, we have also compared the pollution quotas 
determined cooperatively and non-cooperatively. In order to examine this, we gave 
numerical values to some variables under an assumption. We assumed that domestic 
firm is significantly inefficient in production technology relative to foreign firm. Our 
analysis revealed that when marginal cost of domestic firm is very high with respect 
to foreign firm and abatement technology is efficient, cooperation in environmental 
policy let the home government to determine a lower pollution quota and let the 
foreign government to determine a higher pollution quota. However, when the 
abatement technology is not efficient, cooperation in environmental policy let the 
home government to determine a higher pollution quota and let the foreign 
government to determine a higher pollution quota. it is advantageous for firm h to 
increase welfare through disutility of pollution by decreasing production level. So, 
home government always has an incentive to decrease production level. When 
pollution abatement technology is inefficient, home government has one more 
motivation to decrease disutility of pollution. Thus, when pollution abatement 
technology is inefficient, home government prefers to increase pollution quota by 
cooperation. On the other hand, foreign firm is efficient in production technology 
relative to home firm which is an incentive to increase production level. But it is 
inefficient in abatement technology which is an incentive to decrease production 
level. Foreign government prefers to decrease pollution quota by cooperation, 
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because its efficiency in production technology is a stronger incentive than its 
inefficiency in abatement technology.  
All our findings in the free trade case supported the results of the before-
liberalization case. In the last section, we firstly compared the pollution quotas 
determined non-cooperatively before and after liberalization.  Secondly we compared 
the pollution quotas determined cooperatively before and after trade liberalization. In 
the non-cooperative case, trade liberalization let the firm that is inefficient in 
production technology to reduce its pollution quota. On the other hand the firm that 
is efficient in production technology increases its pollution quota with trade 
liberalization. The reason is obvious. Import tariff is a way to protect domestic firms 
from international competition. When trade is liberalized, domestic firm is worse of 
in terms of international competition; since it is inefficient in production technology. 
Thus, home government prefers to increase its welfare by at least eliminating 
pollution with lower pollution quotas. On the other hand foreign government 
increases pollution in order to benefit from the foreign firm’s competitive advantage 
in production technologies.  
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APPENDIX: MODELLING IN MATHEMATICA 
BEFORE LIBERALIZATION: NON-COOPERATION IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
 
MODEL 
 
for i=h,f 
               h:home 
               f:foreign 
xi=output of home country consumed in country i 
yi=ouput of foreign country consumed in country i 
 
ki=marginal cost of country i 
ki=ci+µ (θ-zi) 
         ci=constant marginal cost 
         µ=cost of abatement per unit of output 
         θ=gross pollution per unit of output 
         z=abatement per unit of output 
 
pi=α-β (xi+yi) 
β=1 
 
STAGE 3: 
 
pri=profit function of country i 
 
ph=α-β (xh+yh) 
pf=α-β (xf+yf) 
 
kh=ch+µ(θ-zh) 
52 
kf=cf+µ(θ-zf) 
 
prh=(α-β (xh+yh)-kh) xh+(α-β (xf+yf)-kh-τf) xf 
xh (-ch-xh-yh+α-(-zh+θ) µ)+xf (-ch-xf-yf+α-(-zh+θ) µ-τf) 
 
First Order Conditions: 
 
derpr1=D[prh,xh] 
-ch-2 xh-yh+α-(-zh+θ) µ 
 
derpr2=D[prh,xf] 
-ch-2 xf-yf+α-(-zh+θ) µ-τf 
 
prf=yf (-kf+α-(xf+yf) β)+yh (-kf+α-(xh+yh) β-τh) 
yf (-cf-xf-yf+α-(-zf+θ) µ)+yh (-cf-xh-yh+α-(-zf+θ) µ-τh) 
 
derpr3=D[prf,yh] 
-cf-xh-2 yh+α-(-zf+θ) µ-τh 
 
derpr4=D[prf,yf] 
-cf-xf-2 yf+α-(-zf+θ) µ 
 
Simplify[Solve[{derpr1 0,derpr2 0,derpr3 0,derpr4==0},{xh,xf,yh,yf}]] 
 
{{xh→1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ+τh),xf→1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ-2 
τf),yh→1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ-2 τh),yf→1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ 
µ+τf)}} 
 
d: equilibrium value 
 
dyf=1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ+τf) 
1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ+τf) 
dxf=1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ-2 τf) 
1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ-2 τf) 
dxh=1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ+τh) 
53 
1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ+τh) 
dyh=1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ-2 τh) 
1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ-2 τh) 
 
dprh=FullSimplify[prh/.{xh→dxh,xf→dxf,yh→dyh,yf→dyf}] 
1/9 (2 (cf-2 ch+α-(zf-2 zh+θ) µ)2-4 (cf-2 ch+α-(zf-2 zh+θ) µ) τf+4 τf2+2 (cf-2 ch+α-
(zf-2 zh+θ) µ) τh+τh2) 
 
dprf=FullSimplify[prf/.{xh→dxh,xf→dxf,yh→dyh,yf→dyf}] 
1/9 (8 cf2+2 ch2+2 α2+8 zf2 µ2+2 zh2 µ2+4 zh θ µ2+2 θ2 µ2-2 zh µ τf-2 θ µ 
τf+τf2+4 zf µ (-2 (zh+θ) µ+τf-2 τh)+2 α (4 zf µ-2 (zh+θ) µ+τf-2 τh)+2 ch (2 α+4 zf 
µ-2 (zh+θ) µ+τf-2 τh)-4 cf (2 ch+2 α+4 zf µ-2 (zh+θ) µ+τf-2 τh)+4 zh µ τh+4 θ µ 
τh+4 τh2) 
 
STAGE 2 
 
Wh=β (dxh+dyh)^2/2+dprh+τh*dyh-zh (dxh+dxf) 
1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ-2 τh) τh+1/9 (2 (cf-2 ch+α-(zf-2 zh+θ) µ)2-4 (cf-2 
ch+α-(zf-2 zh+θ) µ) τf+4 τf2+2 (cf-2 ch+α-(zf-2 zh+θ) µ) τh+τh2)-zh (1/3 (cf-2 
ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ-2 τf)+1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ+τh))+1/2 (1/3 (-2 
cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ-2 τh)+1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ+τh))2 
 
derW2=FullSimplify[D[Wh,τh]] 
1/3 (-cf-zh+α+zf µ-θ µ-3 τh) 
 
Wf=β (dxf+dyf)^2/2+dprf+τf*dxf-(zf (dyf+dyh)) 
1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ-2 τf) τf+1/2 (1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ-2 
τf)+1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ+τf))2-zf (1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ 
µ+τf)+1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ-2 τh))+1/9 (8 cf2+2 ch2+2 α2+8 zf2 µ2+2 
zh2 µ2+4 zh θ µ2+2 θ2 µ2-2 zh µ τf-2 θ µ τf+τf2+4 zf µ (-2 (zh+θ) µ+τf-2 τh)+2 α 
(4 zf µ-2 (zh+θ) µ+τf-2 τh)+2 ch (2 α+4 zf µ-2 (zh+θ) µ+τf-2 τh)-4 cf (2 ch+2 α+4 
zf µ-2 (zh+θ) µ+τf-2 τh)+4 zh µ τh+4 θ µ τh+4 τh2) 
 
derW4=FullSimplify[D[Wf,τf]] 
1/3 (-ch-zf+α+zh µ-θ µ-3 τf) 
 
Simplify[Solve[{derW2 0,derW4 0},{τh,τf}]] 
54 
{{τh→1/3 (-cf-zh+α+zf µ-θ µ),τf→1/3 (-ch-zf+α+zh µ-θ µ)}} 
 
dτh=1/3 (-cf-zh+α+zf µ-θ µ) 
1/3 (-cf-zh+α+zf µ-θ µ) 
dτf=1/3 (-ch-zf+α+zh µ-θ µ) 
1/3 (-ch-zf+α+zh µ-θ µ) 
 
substitution 
 
ddxh=FullSimplify[dxh/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/9 (2 cf-6 ch+4 α-2 (zf+2 θ) µ+zh (-1+6 µ)) 
ddxf=FullSimplify[dxf/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/9 (3 cf-4 ch+2 zf+α-(3 zf-4 zh+θ) µ) 
ddyh=FullSimplify[dyh/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/9 (-4 cf+3 ch+2 zh+α-(-4 zf+3 zh+θ) µ) 
ddyf=FullSimplify[dyf/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/9 (-6 cf+2 ch+4 α-2 (zh+2 θ) µ+zf (-1+6 µ)) 
 
ddprh=FullSimplify[dprh/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/81 ((cf+zh-α-zf µ+θ µ)2+4 (ch+zf-α-zh µ+θ µ)2+6 (-cf-zh+α+(zf-θ) µ) (cf-2 ch+α-
(zf-2 zh+θ) µ)+12 (ch+zf-α-zh µ+θ µ) (cf-2 ch+α-(zf-2 zh+θ) µ)+18 (cf-2 ch+α-(zf-
2 zh+θ) µ)2) 
 
ddprf=FullSimplify[dprf/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/81 (52 cf2+13 ch2-4 cf (12 ch-3 zf+4 zh+14 α+2 (13 zf-6 zh-7 θ) µ)+17 (α-θ µ)2+2 
zh (-2+11 µ) (-α+θ µ)+zh2 (4+µ (-12+13 µ))+zf2 (1+4 µ (-3+13 µ))+2 ch (zh (6-13 
µ)+zf (-2+24 µ)+11 (α-θ µ))+4 zf (2 α (-1+7 µ)+µ (5 zh+2 θ-2 (6 zh+7 θ) µ))) 
 
dWh=FullSimplify[Wh/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/162 (54 cf2+113 ch2+2 zh (-45+62 µ) (α-θ µ)+65 (α-θ µ)2+zf2 (8+6 µ (-4+9 µ))-6 
cf (17 ch+15 zh+α-(17 zh+θ) µ+2 zf (-2+9 µ))+2 ch (90 zh-62 α-113 zh µ+62 θ 
µ+zf (-16+51 µ))+zh2 (9+µ (-180+113 µ))-2 zf ((4+3 µ) (-α+θ µ)+zh (18+µ (-61+51 
µ)))) 
 
dWf=FullSimplify[Wf/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
55 
1/162 (113 cf2+54 ch2+2 zh (4+3 µ) (α-θ µ)+65 (α-θ µ)2-6 ch (15 zf-4 zh+α-(17 zf-
18 zh+θ) µ)+zh2 (8+6 µ (-4+9 µ))+zf2 (9+µ (-180+113 µ))-2 cf (51 ch+zh (16-51 
µ)+zf (-90+113 µ)+62 (α-θ µ))-2 zf ((-45+62 µ) (-α+θ µ)+zh (18+µ (-61+51 µ)))) 
 
STAGE 1 
 
derW1=FullSimplify[D[dWh,zh]] 
1/81 (ch (90-113 µ)+cf (-45+51 µ)+(-45+62 µ) (α-θ µ)+zf (-18+(61-51 µ) µ)+zh 
(9+µ (- 
180+113 µ))) 
derW3=FullSimplify[D[dWf,zf]] 
1/81 (cf (90-113 µ)+ch (-45+51 µ)+(-45+62 µ) (α-θ µ)+zh (-18+(61-51 µ) µ)+zf 
(9+µ (-180+113 µ))) 
 
Simplify[Solve[{derW1 0,derW3 0},{zh,zf}]] 
 
{{zh→(cf (-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)+α (1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)+µ (2 ch 
(6777-12552 µ+5084 µ2)+θ (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3)))/(-243-1044 
µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4),zf→(ch (-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)+α (1215-12519 
µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)+µ (2 cf (6777-12552 µ+5084 µ2)+θ (-1215+12519 µ-22322 
µ2+10168 µ3)))/(-243-1044 µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4)}} 
 
dzh=(cf (-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)+α (1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)+µ (2 ch 
(6777-12552 µ+5084 µ2)+θ (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3)))/(-243-1044 
µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
(cf (-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)+α (1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)+µ (2 ch (6777-
12552 µ+5084 µ2)+θ (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3)))/(-243-1044 µ+28877 
µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
 
dzf=(ch (-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)+α (1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)+µ (2 cf 
(6777-12552 µ+5084 µ2)+θ (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3)))/(-243-1044 
µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
(ch (-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)+α (1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)+µ (2 cf (6777-
12552 µ+5084 µ2)+θ (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3)))/(-243-1044 µ+28877 
µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
 
SUBSTITUTION: 
  
dddxh=FullSimplify[ddxh/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
56 
((9+26 µ) (-α+θ µ) (27+µ (-241+164 µ))+cf (81+µ (-927+2406 µ-224 µ2))+2 ch 
(81+2 µ (-135+µ (-1799+1122 µ))))/((-9+µ (-119+62 µ)) (27+µ (-241+164 µ))) 
dddxf=FullSimplify[ddxf/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
((-9+22 µ) (-α+θ µ) (27+µ (-241+164 µ))+cf (-81+µ (2124+7 µ (-133+54 µ)))+ch (-
162+µ (639+µ (-5847+3230 µ))))/((-9+µ (-119+62 µ)) (27+µ (-241+164 µ))) 
dddyh=FullSimplify[ddyh/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
((-9+22 µ) (-α+θ µ) (27+µ (-241+164 µ))+ch (-81+µ (2124+7 µ (-133+54 µ)))+cf (-
162+µ (639+µ (-5847+3230 µ))))/((-9+µ (-119+62 µ)) (27+µ (-241+164 µ))) 
dddyf=FullSimplify[ddyf/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
((9+26 µ) (-α+θ µ) (27+µ (-241+164 µ))+ch (81+µ (-927+2406 µ-224 µ2))+2 cf 
(81+2 µ (-135+µ (-1799+1122 µ))))/((-9+µ (-119+62 µ)) (27+µ (-241+164 µ))) 
 
dddprh=FullSimplify[ddprh/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
(2 (α-θ µ)2 (81+4 µ (9+145 µ)) (27+µ (-241+164 µ))2-2 ch (α-θ µ) (27+µ (-241+164 
µ)) (2916+µ (-9963+µ (-12123+4 µ (-76102+46937 µ))))+cf2 (13122+µ (-494262+µ 
(5911299+µ (-8513136+µ (8676637+28 µ (-63633+6895 µ))))))+ch2 (52488+µ (-
381996+µ (262845+µ (706806+µ (85250725+68 µ (-1505337+449633 µ))))))+2 cf 
(-(α-θ µ) (27+µ (-241+164 µ)) (1458+µ (-27135+µ (52659+4 µ (9164+623 µ))))+ch 
(26244+µ (-589761+µ (2289141+µ (-7638111+µ (-8807373+4 µ (1798184+53907 
µ))))))))/((9+(119-62 µ) µ)2 (27+µ (-241+164 µ))2) 
 
dddprf=FullSimplify[ddprf/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
(2 (α-θ µ)2 (81+4 µ (9+145 µ)) (27+µ (-241+164 µ))2-2 ch (α-θ µ) (27+µ (-241+164 
µ)) (1458+µ (-27135+µ (52659+4 µ (9164+623 µ))))+ch2 (13122+µ (-494262+µ 
(5911299+µ (-8513136+µ (8676637+28 µ (-63633+6895 µ))))))+cf2 (52488+µ (-
381996+µ (262845+µ (706806+µ (85250725+68 µ (-1505337+449633 µ))))))+2 cf 
(-(α-θ µ) (27+µ (-241+164 µ)) (2916+µ (-9963+µ (-12123+4 µ (-76102+46937 
µ))))+ch (26244+µ (-589761+µ (2289141+µ (-7638111+µ (-8807373+4 µ 
(1798184+53907 µ))))))))/((9+(119-62 µ) µ)2 (27+µ (-241+164 µ))2) 
 
ddτh=FullSimplify[dτh/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
((cf+ch-2 α) (9+2 µ))/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))+(2 θ µ (9+2 µ))/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))+(9 
(cf-ch) (-3+5 µ))/(27+µ (-241+164 µ)) 
 
ddτf=FullSimplify[dτf/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
((cf+ch-2 α) (9+2 µ))/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))+(2 θ µ (9+2 µ))/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))-(9 (cf-
ch) (-3+5 µ))/(27+µ (-241+164 µ)) 
 
ddWh=FullSimplify[dWh/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
57 
(-576 µ (-9+2 µ) (α-θ µ)2 (27+µ (-241+164 µ))2+4 ch (α-θ µ) (27+µ (-241+164 µ)) 
(-2187+µ (-35316+µ (690327+4 µ (-195475+51271 µ))))+ch2 (111537+µ 
(290142+µ (-23178150+µ (378642978+µ (-643249875+4 (94894907-18496619 µ) 
µ)))))+cf2 (-124659+µ (2363418+µ (15682734+µ (-32451210+µ (98609053+4 µ (-
25138897+7391109 µ))))))+2 cf (-2 (α-θ µ) (27+µ (-241+164 µ)) (-2187+µ 
(34668+µ (50103+4 µ (-54499+27655 µ))))+ch (6561+µ (562788+µ (-30404484+µ 
(7900884+µ (28872283+4 µ (-6066485+1679731 µ))))))))/(2 (9+(119-62 µ) µ)2 
(27+µ (-241+164 µ))2) 
 
ddWf=FullSimplify[dWf/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
(-576 µ (-9+2 µ) (α-θ µ)2 (27+µ (-241+164 µ))2-4 ch (α-θ µ) (27+µ (-241+164 µ)) (-
2187+µ (34668+µ (50103+4 µ (-54499+27655 µ))))+cf2 (111537+µ (290142+µ (-
23178150+µ (378642978+µ (-643249875+4 (94894907-18496619 µ) µ)))))+ch2 (-
124659+µ (2363418+µ (15682734+µ (-32451210+µ (98609053+4 µ (-
25138897+7391109 µ))))))+2 cf (2 (α-θ µ) (27+µ (-241+164 µ)) (-2187+µ (-
35316+µ (690327+4 µ (-195475+51271 µ))))+ch (6561+µ (562788+µ (-
30404484+µ (7900884+µ (28872283+4 µ (-6066485+1679731 µ))))))))/(2 (9+(119-
62 µ) µ)2 (27+µ (-241+164 µ))2) 
 
 
 
SECOND ORDER CONDITIONS AND STABILITY CONDITIONS 
 
STAGE 1 
SOC of Stage 1 
D[derW1,zh] 
1/81 (9+µ (-180+113 µ)) 
D[derW3,zf] 
1/81 (9+µ (-180+113 µ)) 
 
SOC of Stage 2 
D[derW2,τh] 
-1 
D[derW4,τf] 
-1 
 
SOC of Stage 3 
H2={{D[derpr1,xh],D[derpr1,xf]},{D[derpr2,xh],D[derpr2,xf]}} 
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{{-2,0},{0,-2}} 
H1={{D[derpr1,xh]}} 
{{-2}} 
Reduce[Det[H1]<0&&Det[H2]>0] 
True 
 
SOC Condition 
Reduce[1/81 (9+µ (-180+113 µ))<0&&µ>0] 
3/113 (30- 787 )<µ<3/113 (30+ 787 ) 
 
Stability Conditions 
S1={{D[derW1,zh],D[derW1,zf]},{D[derW3,zh],D[derW3,zf]}} 
{{1/81 (9+µ (-180+113 µ)),1/81 (-18+(61-51 µ) µ)},{1/81 (-18+(61-51 µ) µ),1/81 
(9+µ (-180+113 µ))}} 
Reduce[Det[S1]>0] 
µ<1/124 (119-13 97 )||1/328 (241- 40369 )<µ<1/328 (241+ 40369 )||µ>1/124 
(119+13 97 ) 
S2={{D[derW2,τh],D[derW2,τf]},{D[derW4,τh],D[derW4,τf]}} 
{{-1,0},{0,-1}} 
Reduce[Det[S2]>0] 
True 
 
 
SOLUTION INTERVAL 
Reduce[3/113 (30- 787 )<µ<3/113 (30+ 787 )&&Det[S1]>0] 
1/328 (241- 40369 )<µ<1/328 (241+ 40369 ) 
 
COMPARATIVE STATICS 
"Comparative statics of Stage 1" 
 
D[dzh,ch] 
(2 µ (6777-12552 µ+5084 µ2))/(-243-1044 µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
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Reduce[(2 µ (6777-12552 µ+5084 µ2))/(-243-1044 µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 
µ4)>0&&1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 )] 
1/328 (241- 40369 )<µ<(3138-21 2797 )/2542||1/328 (241+ 40369 )<µ<1/113 
(90+3 787 ) 
 
Reduce[(2 µ (6777-12552 µ+5084 µ2))/(-243-1044 µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 
µ4)≤0&&1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 )] 
1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/328 (241- 40369 )||(3138-21 2797 )/2542≤µ<1/328 
(241+ 40369 ) 
 
D[dzh,cf] 
(-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)/(-243-1044 µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
 
Reduce[(-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)/(-243-1044 µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 
µ4)≤0&&1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 )] 
1/328 (241- 40369 )<µ≤(1035+9 180145 )/5564||1/328 (241+ 40369 )<µ<1/113 
(90+3 787 ) 
 
Reduce[(-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)/(-243-1044 µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 
µ4)>0&&1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 )] 
1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/328 (241- 40369 )||(1035+9 180145 )/5564<µ<1/328 
(241+ 40369 ) 
 
D[dzh, θ ] 
(µ (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3))/(-243-1044 µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 
µ4) 
 
Reduce[(µ (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3))/(-243-1044 µ+28877 µ2-34458 
µ3+10168 µ4)≤0&&1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 )&&0<µ] 
45/62≤µ<1/113 (90+3 787 ) 
 
Reduce[(µ (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3))/(-243-1044 µ+28877 µ2-34458 
µ3+10168 µ4)>0&&1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 )&&0<µ] 
1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<45/62 
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D[dzh, α] 
(1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)/(-243-1044 µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
 
Reduce[(1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)/(-243-1044 µ+28877 µ2-34458 
µ3+10168 µ4)≥0&&1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 )&&0<µ] 
45/62≤µ<1/113 (90+3 787 ) 
 
Reduce[(1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)/(-243-1044 µ+28877 µ2-34458 
µ3+10168 µ4)≤0&&1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 )&&0<µ] 
1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ≤45/62 
 
D[ddτh,ch] 
(9+2 µ)/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))-(9 (-3+5 µ))/(27+µ (-241+164 µ)) 
 
Reduce[(9+2 µ)/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))-(9 (-3+5 µ))/(27+µ (-241+164 µ))≤0&&1/113 
(90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 )&&0<µ] 
1/328 (241- 40369 )<µ≤(8023-5 635473 )/4924||1/328 
(241+ 40369 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 ) 
 
Reduce[(9+2 µ)/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))-(9 (-3+5 µ))/(27+µ (-241+164 µ))ρ0&&1/113 
(90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 )&&0<µ] 
1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/328 (241- 40369 )||(8023-5 
635473 )/4924≤µ<1/328 (241+ 40369 ) 
 
D[ddτh,cf] 
(9+2 µ)/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))+(9 (-3+5 µ))/(27+µ (-241+164 µ)) 
 
Reduce[(9+2 µ)/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))+(9 (-3+5 µ))/(27+µ (-241+164 µ))≤0&&1/113 
(90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 )&&0<µ] 
1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/328 (241- 40369 )||Root[486+693 #1-6035 #12+3118 
#13&,2]≤µ<1/328 (241+ 40369 ) 
 
Reduce[(9+2 µ)/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))+(9 (-3+5 µ))/(27+µ (-241+164 µ))ρ0&&1/113 
(90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 )&&0<µ] 
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1/328 (241- 40369 )<µ≤Root[486+693 #1-6035 #12+3118 #13&,2]||1/328 
(241+ 40369 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 ) 
 
D[ddτh, θ ] 
(2 µ (9+2 µ))/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ)) 
Reduce[(2 µ (9+2 µ))/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))==0&&1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 
(90+3 787 )&&0<µ] 
False 
Reduce[(2 µ (9+2 µ))/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))ρ0&&1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 
787 )&&0<µ] 
False 
Reduce[(2 µ (9+2 µ))/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))≤0&&1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 
787 )&&0<µ] 
1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 ) 
τh is non-increasing in θ 
D[ddτh, α] 
-(2 (9+2 µ))/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ)) 
Reduce[ -(2 (9+2 µ))/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))≤0&&1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 
787 )&&0<µ] 
False 
Reduce[ -(2 (9+2 µ))/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))==0&&1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 
787 )&&0<µ] 
False 
Reduce[-(2 (9+2 µ))/(-9+µ (-119+62 µ))≥0&&1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 
787 )&&0<µ] 
1/113 (90-3 787 )<µ<1/113 (90+3 787 ) 
 
 
BEFORE-LIBERALIZATION: COOPERATION POLLUTION POLICY 
"Z=ZH=ZF" 
STAGE 3: 
 
ph=α-β (xh+yh) 
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pf=α-β (xf+yf) 
 
kh=ch+µ(θ-z) 
kf=cf+µ(θ-z) 
 
pri=profit function of country i 
 
prh=(α-β (xh+yh)-kh) xh+(α-β (xf+yf)-kh-τf) xf 
xh (-ch-xh-yh+α-(-z+θ) µ)+xf (-ch-xf-yf+α-(-z+θ) µ-τf) 
 
derpr1=D[prh,xh] 
-ch-2 xh-yh+α-(-z+θ) µ 
derpr2=D[prh,xf] 
-ch-2 xf-yf+α-(-z+θ) µ-τf 
 
 
prf=yf (-kf+α-(xf+yf) β)+yh (-kf+α-(xh+yh) β-τh) 
yf (-cf-xf-yf+α-(-z+θ) µ)+yh (-cf-xh-yh+α-(-z+θ) µ-τh) 
 
 
derpr3=D[prf,yh] 
-cf-xh-2 yh+α-(-z+θ) µ-τh 
derpr4=D[prf,yf] 
-cf-xf-2 yf+α-(-z+θ) µ 
 
Simplify[Solve[{derpr1 0,derpr2 0,derpr3 0,derpr4==0},{xh,xf,yh,yf}]] 
 
{{xh→1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ+τh),xf→1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ-2 τf),yh→1/3 (-2 
cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ-2 τh),yf→1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ+τf)}} 
 
dyf=1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ+τf) 
1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ+τf) 
dxf=1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ-2 τf) 
1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ-2 τf) 
dxh=1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ+τh) 
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1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ+τh) 
dyh=1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ-2 τh) 
1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ-2 τh) 
 
dprh=FullSimplify[prh/.{xh→dxh,xf→dxf,yh→dyh,yf→dyf}] 
1/9 (2 (cf-2 ch+α+(z-θ) µ)2-4 (cf-2 ch+α+(z-θ) µ) τf+4 τf2+2 (cf-2 ch+α+(z-θ) µ) 
τh+τh2) 
dprf=FullSimplify[prf/.{xh→dxh,xf→dxf,yh→dyh,yf→dyf}] 
1/9 (8 cf2+2 ch2+2 α2+2 z2 µ2+2 θ2 µ2-2 θ µ τf+τf2+2 z µ (-2 θ µ+τf-2 τh)+2 α (2 z 
µ-2 θ µ+τf-2 τh)+2 ch (2 α+2 z µ-2 θ µ+τf-2 τh)-4 cf (2 ch+2 α+2 z µ-2 θ µ+τf-2 
τh)+4 θ µ τh+4 τh2) 
 
 
STAGE 2 
 
Wh=β (dxh+dyh)^2/2+dprh+τh*dyh-z (dxh+dxf) 
1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ-2 τh) τh+1/9 (2 (cf-2 ch+α+(z-θ) µ)2-4 (cf-2 ch+α+(z-θ) µ) 
τf+4 τf2+2 (cf-2 ch+α+(z-θ) µ) τh+τh2)-z (1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ-2 τf)+1/3 (cf-2 
ch+α+z µ-θ µ+τh))+1/2 (1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ-2 τh)+1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ 
µ+τh))2 
 
derW1=FullSimplify[D[Wh,τh]] 
1/3 (-cf-z+α+z µ-θ µ-3 τh) 
 
Wf=β (dxf+dyf)^2/2+dprf+τf*dxf-(z (dyf+dyh)) 
1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ-2 τf) τf+1/2 (1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ-2 τf)+1/3 (-2 
cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ+τf))2-z (1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ+τf)+1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ-2 
τh))+1/9 (8 cf2+2 ch2+2 α2+2 z2 µ2+2 θ2 µ2-2 θ µ τf+τf2+2 z µ (-2 θ µ+τf-2 τh)+2 
α (2 z µ-2 θ µ+τf-2 τh)+2 ch (2 α+2 z µ-2 θ µ+τf-2 τh)-4 cf (2 ch+2 α+2 z µ-2 θ 
µ+τf-2 τh)+4 θ µ τh+4 τh2) 
 
derW2=FullSimplify[D[Wf,τf]] 
1/3 (-ch-z+α+z µ-θ µ-3 τf) 
 
Simplify[Solve[{derW1 0,derW2 0},{τh,τf}]] 
{{τh→1/3 (-cf+α+z (-1+µ)-θ µ),τf→1/3 (-ch+α+z (-1+µ)-θ µ)}} 
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dτh=1/3 (-cf+α+z (-1+µ)-θ µ) 
1/3 (-cf+α+z (-1+µ)-θ µ) 
dτf=1/3 (-ch+α+z (-1+µ)-θ µ) 
1/3 (-ch+α+z (-1+µ)-θ µ) 
 
substitution 
 
ddxh=FullSimplify[dxh/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/9 (2 cf-6 ch-z+4 α+4 z µ-4 θ µ) 
ddxf=FullSimplify[dxf/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/9 (3 cf-4 ch+α-θ µ+z (2+µ)) 
ddyh=FullSimplify[dyh/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/9 (-4 cf+3 ch+α-θ µ+z (2+µ)) 
ddyf=FullSimplify[dyf/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/9 (-6 cf+2 ch-z+4 α+4 z µ-4 θ µ) 
 
ddprh=FullSimplify[dprh/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/81 (13 cf2-48 cf ch+52 ch2+8 cf z-4 ch z+5 z2+22 cf α-56 ch α-4 z α+17 α2+2 (11 
cf-28 ch-2 z+17 α) (z-θ) µ+17 (z-θ)2 µ2) 
ddprf=FullSimplify[dprf/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/81 (52 cf2-48 cf ch+13 ch2-4 cf z+8 ch z+5 z2-56 cf α+22 ch α-4 z α+17 α2-2 (28 
cf-11 ch+2 z-17 α) (z-θ) µ+17 (z-θ)2 µ2) 
 
dWh=FullSimplify[Wh/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/162 (54 cf2+113 ch2-4 ch (-37 z+31 α+31 (z-θ) µ)+(-19 z+13 α+13 (z-θ) µ) (z+5 
α+5 z µ-5 θ µ)-6 cf (17 ch+α-θ µ+z (11+µ))) 
dWf=FullSimplify[Wf/.{τh→dτh,τf→dτf}] 
1/162 (113 cf2+54 ch2-2 cf (51 ch-74 z+62 α+62 (z-θ) µ)+(-19 z+13 α+13 (z-θ) µ) 
(z+5 α+5 z µ-5 θ µ)-6 ch (α-θ µ+z (11+µ))) 
 
STAGE 1 
 
WT=dWh+dWf 
1/162 (113 cf2+54 ch2-2 cf (51 ch-74 z+62 α+62 (z-θ) µ)+(-19 z+13 α+13 (z-θ) µ) 
(z+5 α+5 z µ-5 θ µ)-6 ch (α-θ µ+z (11+µ)))+1/162 (54 cf2+113 ch2-4 ch (-37 z+31 
65 
α+31 (z-θ) µ)+(-19 z+13 α+13 (z-θ) µ) (z+5 α+5 z µ-5 θ µ)-6 cf (17 ch+α-θ µ+z 
(11+µ))) 
 
derW3=FullSimplify[D[WT,z]] 
1/81 (cf (41-65 µ)+ch (41-65 µ)+2 (z (1+5 µ) (-19+13 µ)+(-41+65 µ) (α-θ µ))) 
 
Simplify[Solve[{derW3 0},{z}]] 
{{z→((-41+65 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2))}} 
 
dz=((-41+65 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2)) 
((-41+65 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2)) 
 
SUBSTITUTION: 
  
ddτh=FullSimplify[dτh/.{z→dz}] 
1/3 (-cf+α-θ µ+((-1+µ) (-41+65 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2))) 
ddτf=FullSimplify[dτf/.{z→dz}] 
1/3 (-ch+α-θ µ+((-1+µ) (-41+65 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2))) 
 
dddxh=FullSimplify[ddxh/.{z→dz}] 
(18 (13+11 µ) (-α+θ µ)+ch (269+755 µ-520 µ2)+cf (-35+µ (-557+520 µ)))/(18 (1+5 
µ) (-19+13 µ)) 
dddxf=FullSimplify[ddxf/.{z→dz}] 
1/9 (3 cf-4 ch+α-θ µ+((2+µ) (-41+65 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2))) 
dddyh=FullSimplify[ddyh/.{z→dz}] 
1/9 (-4 cf+3 ch+α-θ µ+((2+µ) (-41+65 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2))) 
dddyf=FullSimplify[ddyf/.{z→dz}] 
(18 (13+11 µ) (-α+θ µ)+cf (269+755 µ-520 µ2)+ch (-35+µ (-557+520 µ)))/(18 (1+5 
µ) (-19+13 µ)) 
 
dddprh=FullSimplify[ddprh/.{z→dz}] 
1/(324 (19+(82-65 µ) µ)2) (648 (α-θ µ)2 (109+µ (10+241 µ))+36 ch (α-θ µ) (-
3007+µ (-8889+5 µ (-3777+2873 µ)))+ch2 (77261+5 µ (102098+µ (156318+65 µ (-
4502+1469 µ))))+cf2 (39641+µ (196966+µ (257898+65 µ (-14554+7345 µ))))-2 cf 
(18 (α-θ µ) (917+µ (-8529+µ (-10209+14365 µ)))+ch (23135+µ (350488+5 µ 
(88332+1469 µ (-164+65 µ)))))) 
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dddprf=FullSimplify[ddprf/.{z→dz}] 
1/(324 (19+(82-65 µ) µ)2) (648 (α-θ µ)2 (109+µ (10+241 µ))-36 ch (α-θ µ) (917+µ 
(-8529+µ (-10209+14365 µ)))+cf2 (77261+5 µ (102098+µ (156318+65 µ (-
4502+1469 µ))))+ch2 (39641+µ (196966+µ (257898+65 µ (-14554+7345 µ))))-2 cf 
(-18 (α-θ µ) (-3007+µ (-8889+5 µ (-3777+2873 µ)))+ch (23135+µ (350488+5 µ 
(88332+1469 µ (-164+65 µ)))))) 
 
ddWh=FullSimplify[dWh/.{z→dz}] 
(-11664 (α-θ µ)2+2592 ch (-13+7 µ) (-α+θ µ)+cf2 (2989+5 µ (-6226+3497 µ))+ch2 
(-19043+µ (-12986+17485 µ))+2 cf (1296 (-4+7 µ) (α-θ µ)+ch (2195-269 µ (-82+65 
µ))))/(648 (1+5 µ) (-19+13 µ)) 
ddWf=FullSimplify[dWf/.{z→dz}] 
(2592 ch (-4+7 µ) (α-θ µ)-11664 (α-θ µ)2+ch2 (2989+5 µ (-6226+3497 µ))+cf2 (-
19043+µ (-12986+17485 µ))+cf (2592 (-13+7 µ) (-α+θ µ)+ch (4390-538 µ (-82+65 
µ))))/(648 (1+5 µ) (-19+13 µ)) 
 
dWT=FullSimplify[WT/.{z→dz}] 
(11664 ch (α-θ µ)-11664 (α-θ µ)2+cf2 (-8027+269 µ (-82+65 µ))+ch2 (-8027+269 µ 
(-82+65 µ))+2 cf (5832 (α-θ µ)+ch (2195-269 µ (-82+65 µ))))/(324 (1+5 µ) (-19+13 
µ)) 
 
 
 
SECOND ORDER CONDITIONS AND STABILITY CONDITIONS 
STAGE 1 
SOC of Stage 1 
D[derW3,z] 
2/81 (1+5 µ) (-19+13 µ) 
SOC of Stage 2 
D[derW1,τh] 
-1 
SOC of stage 1 
H2={{D[derpr1,xh],D[derpr1,xf]},{D[derpr2,xh],D[derpr2,xf]}} 
{{-2,0},{0,-2}} 
H1={{D[derpr1,xh]}} 
{{-2}} 
Reduce[Det[H1]<0&&Det[H2]>0] 
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True 
SOC Condition 
 
Reduce[2/81 (1+5 µ) (-19+13 µ)<0&&µ>0] 
0<µ<19/13 
"stability condition of stage 2 holds" 
J={{D[derW1,τh],D[derW1,τf]},{D[derW2,τh],D[derW2,τf]}} 
{{-1,0},{0,-1}} 
Simplify[Det[J]] 
1 
 
COMPARATIVE STATICS 
"Comparative statics of Stage 1" 
"Comparative Statics on Policy Arguments:" 
"dzh=(cf (-135-105 µ+412 µ2)+α (135-1533 µ+2918 µ2-1408 µ3)+µ (2 ch (819-
1665 µ+704 µ2)+θ (-135+1533 µ-2918 µ2+1408 µ3)))/(-27-120 µ+3833 µ2-4710 
µ3+1408 µ4)" 
D[dz,ch] 
(-41+65 µ)/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2)) 
0<µ<19/13 
Reduce[(-41+65 µ)/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2))≥0&&0<µ<19/13] 
0<µ≤41/65 
Reduce[(-41+65 µ)/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2))≤0&&0<µ<19/13] 
41/65≤µ<19/13 
D[dz,cf] 
(-41+65 µ)/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2)) 
Reduce[(-41+65 µ)/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2))≥0&&0<µ<19/13] 
0<µ≤41/65 
Reduce[(-41+65 µ)/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2))≤0&&0<µ<19/13] 
41/65≤µ<19/13 
D[dz,µ] 
-((-41+65 µ) (-82+130 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ^2)2)+(θ (-41+65 
µ))/(-19-82 µ+65 µ2)+(65 (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2)) 
D[dz, θ ] 
(µ (-41+65 µ))/(-19-82 µ+65 µ2) 
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Reduce[(µ (-41+65 µ))/(-19-82 µ+65 µ2)≥0&&0<µ<19/13] 
0<µ≤41/65 
Reduce[(µ (-41+65 µ))/(-19-82 µ+65 µ2)≤0&&0<µ<19/13] 
41/65≤µ<19/13 
D[dz, α] 
-(-41+65 µ)/(-19-82 µ+65 µ2) 
Reduce[-(-41+65 µ)/(-19-82 µ+65 µ2)≥0&&0<µ<19/13] 
41/65≤µ<19/13 
Reduce[-(-41+65 µ)/(-19-82 µ+65 µ2)≤0&&0<µ<19/13] 
0<µ≤41/65 
D[ddτh,ch] 
((-1+µ) (-41+65 µ))/(6 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2)) 
Reduce[((-1+µ) (-41+65 µ))/(6 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2))≤0&&0<µ<19/13] 
0<µ≤41/65||1≤µ<19/13 
Reduce[((-1+µ) (-41+65 µ))/(6 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2))ρ0&&0<µ<19/13] 
41/65≤µ≤1 
D[ddτh,cf] 
1/3 (-1+((-1+µ) (-41+65 µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2))) 
Reduce[1/3 (-1+((-1+µ) (-41+65 µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2)))≤0&&0<µ<19/13] 
0<µ<19/13 
Reduce[1/3 (-1+((-1+µ) (-41+65 µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2)))ρ0&&0<µ<19/13] 
False 
Simplify[D[ddτh,µ]] 
(4 (-448 α-95 θ+650 α µ+76 θ µ-130 α µ2-161 θ µ2+cf (224-325 µ+65 µ2)+ch 
(224-325 µ+65 µ2)))/(19+82 µ-65 µ^2)2 
D[ddτh, θ ] 
1/3 (-µ+((-1+µ) µ (-41+65 µ))/(-19-82 µ+65 µ2)) 
Reduce[1/3 (-µ+((-1+µ) µ (-41+65 µ))/(-19-82 µ+65 µ2))>0&&0<µ<19/13] 
False 
Reduce[1/3 (-µ+((-1+µ) µ (-41+65 µ))/(-19-82 µ+65 µ2))≤0&&0<µ<19/13] 
0<µ<19/13 
τh is non-decreasing in θ 
D[ddτh, α] 
1/3 (1-((-1+µ) (-41+65 µ))/(-19-82 µ+65 µ2)) 
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Reduce[1/3 (1-((-1+µ) (-41+65 µ))/(-19-82 µ+65 µ2))>0&&0<µ<19/13] 
0<µ<19/13 
Reduce[1/3 (1-((-1+µ) (-41+65 µ))/(-19-82 µ+65 µ2))≤0&&0<µ<19/13] 
False 
τh is non-decreasing in α 
 
COMPARISON:Non-cooperative and cooperation in z 
"13/100<µ<130/100" 
α=100 
100 
θ=50 
50 
ch=1000 
1000 
cf=1 
1 
 
zh20=(cf (-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)+α (1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)+µ (2 ch 
(6777-12552 µ+5084 µ2)+θ (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3)))/(-243-1044 
µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
(-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2+100 (1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)+µ (2000 (6777-
12552 µ+5084 µ2)+50 (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3)))/(-243-1044 µ+28877 
µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
 
z21=((-41+65 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2)) 
((-41+65 µ) (801+100 µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2)) 
 
FullSimplify[farkzh=zh20-z21] 
1/4 (12313/(19-13 µ)-3905/(1+5 µ)+(70290-114124 µ)/(9+(119-62 µ) µ)+(1998 (-
135+164 µ))/(27+µ (-241+164 µ))) 
 
Plot[farkzh,{µ,13/100,130/100}] 
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zf20=(ch (-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)+α (1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)+µ (2 cf 
(6777-12552 µ+5084 µ2)+θ (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3)))/(-243-1044 
µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
(1000 (-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)+100 (1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)+µ (2 
(6777-12552 µ+5084 µ2)+50 (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3)))/(-243-1044 
µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
 
FullSimplify[farkzf=zf20-z21] 
1/4 (12313/(19-13 µ)-3905/(1+5 µ)+(70290-114124 µ)/(9+(119-62 µ) µ)+(1998 
(135-164 µ))/(27+µ (-241+164 µ))) 
 
Plot[{farkzh,farkzf},{µ,13/100,130/100}] 
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TRADE LIBERALIZATION:NON-COOPERATIVE SOLUTION 
 
STAGE 2: 
 
ph=α-β (xh+yh) 
pf=α-β (xf+yf) 
 
kh=ch+µ(θ-zh) 
kf=cf+µ(θ-zf) 
 
pri=profit function of country i 
 
prh=(α-β (xh+yh)-kh) xh+(α-β (xf+yf)-kh) xf 
xf (-ch-xf-yf+α-(-zh+θ) µ)+xh (-ch-xh-yh+α-(-zh+θ) µ) 
derpr1=D[prh,xh] 
-ch-2 xh-yh+α-(-zh+θ) µ 
derpr2=D[prh,xf] 
-ch-2 xf-yf+α-(-zh+θ) µ 
 
prf=yf (-kf+α-(xf+yf) β)+yh (-kf+α-(xh+yh) β) 
yf (-cf-xf-yf+α-(-zf+θ) µ)+yh (-cf-xh-yh+α-(-zf+θ) µ) 
derpr3=D[prf,yh] 
-cf-xh-2 yh+α-(-zf+θ) µ 
derpr4=D[prf,yf] 
-cf-xf-2 yf+α-(-zf+θ) µ 
 
Simplify[Solve[{derpr1 0,derpr2 0,derpr3 0,derpr4==0},{xh,xf,yh,yf}]] 
 
{{xh→1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ),xf→1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ 
µ),yh→1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ),yf→1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ)}} 
 
dyf=1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ) 
1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ) 
dxf=1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ) 
1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ) 
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dxh=1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ) 
1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ) 
dyh=1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ) 
1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ) 
 
dprh=FullSimplify[prh/.{xh→dxh,xf→dxf,yh→dyh,yf→dyf}] 
2/9 (cf-2 ch+α-(zf-2 zh+θ) µ)2 
dprf=FullSimplify[prf/.{xh→dxh,xf→dxf,yh→dyh,yf→dyf}] 
2/9 (-2 cf+ch+α+(2 zf-zh-θ) µ)2 
 
STAGE 1 
 
Wh=β (dxh+dyh)^2/2+dprh-zh (dxh+dxf) 
-2/3 zh (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ)+2/9 (cf-2 ch+α-(zf-2 zh+θ) µ)2+1/2 (1/3 (-2 
cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ)+1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ))2 
derW1=FullSimplify[D[Wh,zh]] 
1/9 (-6 (cf-2 ch+α)+(7 cf-17 ch+6 zf-24 zh+10 α+6 θ) µ+(-7 zf+17 zh-10 θ) µ2) 
 
 
Wf=β (dxf+dyf)^2/2+dprf-(zf (dyf+dyh)) 
2/9 (-2 cf+ch+α+(2 zf-zh-θ) µ)2-2/3 zf (-2 cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ)+1/2 (1/3 (-2 
cf+ch+α+2 zf µ-zh µ-θ µ)+1/3 (cf-2 ch+α-zf µ+2 zh µ-θ µ))2 
derW2=FullSimplify[D[Wf,zf]] 
1/9 (-6 (ch+α)+cf (12-17 µ)+µ (7 ch+6 zh+10 α+6 θ-7 zh µ-10 θ µ+zf (-24+17 µ))) 
 
Simplify[Solve[{derW1 0,derW2 0},{zh,zf}]] 
{{zh→(cf (-6+7 µ)+ch (21-44 µ+20 µ2)-(α-θ µ) (15-37 µ+20 µ2))/(µ (45-61 µ+20 
µ2)),zf→(ch (-6+7 µ)+cf (21-44 µ+20 µ2)-(α-θ µ) (15-37 µ+20 µ2))/(µ (45-61 µ+20 
µ2))}} 
dzh=(cf (-6+7 µ)+ch (21-44 µ+20 µ2)-(α-θ µ) (15-37 µ+20 µ2))/(µ (45-61 µ+20 
µ2)) 
(cf (-6+7 µ)+ch (21-44 µ+20 µ2)-(α-θ µ) (15-37 µ+20 µ2))/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2)) 
dzf=(ch (-6+7 µ)+cf (21-44 µ+20 µ2)-(α-θ µ) (15-37 µ+20 µ2))/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2)) 
(ch (-6+7 µ)+cf (21-44 µ+20 µ2)-(α-θ µ) (15-37 µ+20 µ2))/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2)) 
 
substitution 
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ddxh=FullSimplify[dxh/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
(cf-ch)/(5-4 µ)+(cf+ch-2 α)/(-9+5 µ)+(2 θ µ)/(-9+5 µ) 
ddxf=FullSimplify[dxf/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
(cf-ch)/(5-4 µ)+(cf+ch-2 α)/(-9+5 µ)+(2 θ µ)/(-9+5 µ) 
ddyh=FullSimplify[dyh/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
(cf-ch)/(-5+4 µ)+(cf+ch-2 α)/(-9+5 µ)+(2 θ µ)/(-9+5 µ) 
ddyf=FullSimplify[dyf/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
(cf-ch)/(-5+4 µ)+(cf+ch-2 α)/(-9+5 µ)+(2 θ µ)/(-9+5 µ) 
 
ddprh=FullSimplify[dprh/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
(2 (ch (14-9 µ)+cf (-4+µ)+2 (-5+4 µ) (α-θ µ))2)/(45-61 µ+20 µ^2)2 
ddprf=FullSimplify[dprf/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
(2 (-ch (-4+µ)+cf (-14+9 µ)+2 (-5+4 µ) (-α+θ µ))2)/(45-61 µ+20 µ^2)2 
 
dWh=FullSimplify[Wh/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
1/((9-5 µ)2 (5-4 µ)2 µ) 2 (-2 (5-4 µ)2 (-3+µ) (α-θ µ)2+ch (-5+4 µ) (α-θ µ) (84+µ (-
109+33 µ))+ch2 (294+µ (-584+(384-83 µ) µ))+cf (-24+17 µ) (ch (7+µ (-7+2 µ))-(α-
θ µ) (5+µ (-9+4 µ)))+cf2 (24+µ (7+µ (-41+17 µ)))) 
 
dWf=FullSimplify[Wf/.{zh→dzh,zf→dzf}] 
-1/((9-5 µ)2 (5-4 µ)2 µ) 2 (ch (-1+µ) (-5+4 µ) (-24+17 µ) (α-θ µ)+2 (5-4 µ)2 (-3+µ) 
(α-θ µ)2-ch2 (24+µ (7+µ (-41+17 µ)))+cf (-ch (-24+17 µ) (7+µ (-7+2 µ))+(-5+4 µ) (-
α+θ µ) (84+µ (-109+33 µ)))+cf2 (-294+µ (584+µ (-384+83 µ)))) 
 
SECOND OREDER CONDITIONS AND STABILITY CONDITIONS 
STAGE 1 
SOC of Stage 1 
D[derW1,zh] 
1/9 (-24 µ+17 µ2) 
D[derW2,zf] 
1/9 µ (-24+17 µ) 
SOC of Stage 2 
H2={{D[derpr1,xh],D[derpr1,xf]},{D[derpr2,xh],D[derpr2,xf]}} 
{{-2,0},{0,-2}} 
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H1={{D[derpr1,xh]}} 
{{-2}} 
Reduce[Det[H1]<0&&Det[H2]>0] 
True 
SOC Condition 
 
Reduce[1/9 (-24 µ+17 µ2)<0&&µ>0] 
0<µ<24/17 
Stability Conditions 
S1={{D[derW1,zh],D[derW1,zf]},{D[derW2,zh],D[derW2,zf]}} 
{{1/9 (-24 µ+17 µ2),1/9 (6 µ-7 µ2)},{1/9 (6-7 µ) µ,1/9 µ (-24+17 µ)}} 
Reduce[Det[S1]>0&&µ>0] 
0<µ<5/4||µ>9/5 
SOLUTION INTERVAL 
Reduce[0<µ<24/17&&Det[S1]>0] 
0<µ<5/4 
COMPARATIVE STATICS 
"Comparative statics of Stage 1" 
D[dzh,ch] 
(21-44 µ+20 µ2)/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2)) 
Reduce[(21-44 µ+20 µ2)/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2))>0&&0<µ<5/4] 
0<µ<7/10 
Reduce[(21-44 µ+20 µ2)/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2))≤0&&0<µ<5/4] 
7/10≤µ<5/4 
D[dzh,cf] 
(-6+7 µ)/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2)) 
Reduce[(-6+7 µ)/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2))≤0&&0<µ<5/4] 
0<µ≤6/7 
Reduce[(-6+7 µ)/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2))>0&&0<µ<5/4] 
6/7<µ<5/4 
Simplify[D[dzh,µ]] 
(cf (270-732 µ+787 µ2-280 µ3)+ch (-945+2562 µ-3044 µ2+1760 µ3-400 µ4)+(5-4 
µ)2 (-30 θ µ2+α (27-30 µ+25 µ2)))/(µ2 (45-61 µ+20 µ^2)2) 
D[dzh, θ ] 
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(15-37 µ+20 µ2)/(45-61 µ+20 µ2) 
Reduce[(15-37 µ+20 µ2)/(45-61 µ+20 µ2)≤0&&0<µ<5/4] 
3/5≤µ<5/4 
Reduce[(15-37 µ+20 µ2)/(45-61 µ+20 µ2)>0&&0<µ<5/4] 
0<µ<3/5 
D[dzh, α] 
(-15+37 µ-20 µ2)/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2)) 
Reduce[(-15+37 µ-20 µ2)/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2))≥0&&0<µ<5/4] 
3/5≤µ<5/4 
Reduce[(-15+37 µ-20 µ2)/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2))≤0&&0<µ<5/4] 
0<µ≤3/5 
 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION:COOPERATION POLLUTION POLICY 
"Z=ZH=ZF" 
 
STAGE 3: 
 
ph=α-β (xh+yh) 
-xh-yh+α 
pf=α-β (xf+yf) 
-xf-yf+α 
kh=ch+µ(θ-z) 
ch+(-z+θ) µ 
kf=cf+µ(θ-z) 
cf+(-z+θ) µ 
 
pri=profit function of country i 
 
prh=(α-β (xh+yh)-kh) xh+(α-β (xf+yf)-kh) xf 
xf (-ch-xf-yf+α-(-z+θ) µ)+xh (-ch-xh-yh+α-(-z+θ) µ) 
 
derpr1=D[prh,xh] 
-ch-2 xh-yh+α-(-z+θ) µ 
derpr2=D[prh,xf] 
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-ch-2 xf-yf+α-(-z+θ) µ 
 
 
prf=yf (-kf+α-(xf+yf) β)+yh (-kf+α-(xh+yh) β) 
yf (-cf-xf-yf+α-(-z+θ) µ)+yh (-cf-xh-yh+α-(-z+θ) µ) 
 
 
derpr3=D[prf,yh] 
-cf-xh-2 yh+α-(-z+θ) µ 
derpr4=D[prf,yf] 
-cf-xf-2 yf+α-(-z+θ) µ 
 
Simplify[Solve[{derpr1 0,derpr2 0,derpr3 0,derpr4==0},{xh,xf,yh,yf}]] 
 
{{xh→1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ),xf→1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ),yh→1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z 
µ-θ µ),yf→1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ)}} 
dyf=1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ) 
1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ) 
dxf=1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ) 
1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ) 
dxh=1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ) 
1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ) 
dyh=1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ) 
1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ) 
dprh=FullSimplify[prh/.{xh→dxh,xf→dxf,yh→dyh,yf→dyf}] 
2/9 (cf-2 ch+α+(z-θ) µ)2 
dprf=FullSimplify[prf/.{xh→dxh,xf→dxf,yh→dyh,yf→dyf}] 
2/9 (-2 cf+ch+α+(z-θ) µ)2 
 
 
STAGE 2 
 
Wh=β (dxh+dyh)^2/2+dprh-z (dxh+dxf) 
2/9 (cf-2 ch+α+(z-θ) µ)2-2/3 z (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ µ)+1/2 (1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ 
µ)+1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ))2 
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Wf=β (dxf+dyf)^2/2+dprf-(z (dyf+dyh)) 
2/9 (-2 cf+ch+α+(z-θ) µ)2-2/3 z (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ)+1/2 (1/3 (cf-2 ch+α+z µ-θ 
µ)+1/3 (-2 cf+ch+α+z µ-θ µ))2 
FullSimplify[WT=Wh+Wf] 
1/9 (11 cf2+11 ch2-2 cf (7 ch-3 z+4 α+4 z µ-4 θ µ)+4 (α+(z-θ) µ) (-3 z+2 α+2 z µ-2 
θ µ)+ch (-8 α+z (6-8 µ)+8 θ µ)) 
derW=FullSimplify[D[WT,z]] 
1/9 (6 (cf+ch-2 α)-4 (2 (cf+ch+3 z-2 α)-3 θ) µ+16 (z-θ) µ2) 
Simplify[Solve[{derW 0},{z}]] 
{{z→((-3+4 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(4 µ (-3+2 µ))}} 
dz=((-3+4 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(4 µ (-3+2 µ)) 
((-3+4 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(4 µ (-3+2 µ)) 
 
SUBSTITUTION: 
  
ddxh=FullSimplify[dxh/.{z→dz}] 
(-5 cf+7 ch-2 α+2 (2 cf-2 ch+θ) µ)/(-12+8 µ) 
ddxf=FullSimplify[dxf/.{z→dz}] 
(-5 cf+7 ch-2 α+2 (2 cf-2 ch+θ) µ)/(-12+8 µ) 
ddyh=FullSimplify[dyh/.{z→dz}] 
(-2 α+cf (7-4 µ)+2 θ µ+ch (-5+4 µ))/(-12+8 µ) 
ddyf=FullSimplify[dyf/.{z→dz}] 
(-2 α+cf (7-4 µ)+2 θ µ+ch (-5+4 µ))/(-12+8 µ) 
ddprh=FullSimplify[dprh/.{z→dz}] 
(5 cf-7 ch+2 α-2 (2 cf-2 ch+θ) µ)2/(8 (3-2 µ)2) 
ddprf=FullSimplify[dprf/.{z→dz}] 
(7 cf-5 ch-2 α-4 cf µ+4 ch µ+2 θ µ)2/(8 (3-2 µ)2) 
dWh=FullSimplify[Wh/.{z→dz}] 
1/(8 µ (-3+2 µ)) (-2 cf (ch+4 α)+8 cf (3 ch+α+θ) µ-8 cf (2 ch+θ) µ2-4 (α-θ µ)2+8 ch 
(-2+µ) (-α+θ µ)+cf2 (5+8 (-2+µ) µ)+ch2 (-7+8 (-1+µ) µ)) 
dWf=FullSimplify[Wf/.{z→dz}] 
1/(8 µ (-3+2 µ)) (8 ch (-1+µ) (α-θ µ)-4 (α-θ µ)2+ch2 (5+8 (-2+µ) µ)+cf2 (-7+8 (-
1+µ) µ)-2 cf (4 (-2+µ) (α-θ µ)+ch (1+4 µ (-3+2 µ)))) 
dWT=FullSimplify[WT/.{z→dz}] 
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SECOND ORDER CONDITIONS AND STABILITY CONDITIONS 
STAGE 1 
SOC of Stage 1 
D[derW,z] 
1/9 (-24 µ+16 µ2) 
SOC of stage 2 
H2={{D[derpr1,xh],D[derpr1,xf]},{D[derpr2,xh],D[derpr2,xf]}} 
{{-2,0},{0,-2}} 
H1={{D[derpr1,xh]}} 
{{-2}} 
Reduce[Det[H1]<0&&Det[H2]>0] 
True 
SOC Condition 
 
Reduce[1/9 (-24 µ+16 µ2)<0&&µ>0] 
0<µ<3/2 
COMPARATIVE STATICS 
"Comparative statics of Stage 1" 
"Comparative Statics on Policy Arguments:" 
D[dz,ch] 
(-3+4 µ)/(4 µ (-3+2 µ)) 
Reduce[(-3+4 µ)/(4 µ (-3+2 µ))≥0&&0<µ<3/2] 
0<µ≤3/4 
Reduce[(-3+4 µ)/(4 µ (-3+2 µ))≤0&&0<µ<3/2] 
3/4≤µ<3/2 
D[dz,cf] 
(-3+4 µ)/(4 µ (-3+2 µ)) 
Reduce[(-3+4 µ)/(4 µ (-3+2 µ))≥0&&0<µ<3/2] 
0<µ≤3/4 
Reduce[(-3+4 µ)/(4 µ (-3+2 µ))≤0&&0<µ<3/2] 
3/4≤µ<3/2 
D[dz,µ] 
(θ (-3+4 µ))/(2 µ (-3+2 µ))+(cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ)/(µ (-3+2 µ))-((-3+4 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 
θ µ))/(2 µ (-3+2 µ)2)-((-3+4 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(4 µ2 (-3+2 µ)) 
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D[dz, θ ] 
(-3+4 µ)/(2 (-3+2 µ)) 
Reduce[(-3+4 µ)/(2 (-3+2 µ))≥0&&0<µ<3/2] 
0<µ≤3/4 
Reduce[(-3+4 µ)/(2 (-3+2 µ))≤0&&0<µ<3/2] 
3/4≤µ<3/2 
D[dz, α] 
-(-3+4 µ)/(2 µ (-3+2 µ)) 
Reduce[-(-3+4 µ)/(2 µ (-3+2 µ))≥0&&0<µ<3/2] 
3/4≤µ<3/2 
Reduce[-(-3+4 µ)/(2 µ (-3+2 µ))≤0&&0<µ<3/2] 
0<µ≤3/4-((cf+ch-2 α)2+4 (3 (cf-ch)2+(cf+ch-2 α) θ) µ+4 (-2 (cf-ch)2+θ2) µ2)/(4 µ (-
3+2 µ)) 
 
COMPARISON:Non-cooperative and cooperation in z 
 
"0<µ<5/4" 
α=100 
100 
θ=50 
50 
ch=1000 
1000 
cf=1 
1 
zh30=(cf (-6+7 µ)+ch (21-44 µ+20 µ2)-(α-θ µ) (15-37 µ+20 µ2))/(µ (45-61 µ+20 
µ2)) 
(-6+7 µ+1000 (21-44 µ+20 µ2)-(100-50 µ) (15-37 µ+20 µ2))/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2)) 
z31=((-3+4 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(4 µ (-3+2 µ)) 
((-3+4 µ) (801+100 µ))/(4 µ (-3+2 µ)) 
FullSimplify[farkzh=zh30-z31] 
951/(6-4 µ)+4659/(20 µ)+3996/(5 (-5+4 µ))+1635/(-9+5 µ) 
Plot[farkzh,{µ,0,5/4}] 
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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
 2000
 1000
1000
2000
3000
 
zf30=(ch (-6+7 µ)+cf (21-44 µ+20 µ2)-(α-θ µ) (15-37 µ+20 µ2))/(µ (45-61 µ+20 
µ2)) 
(21-44 µ+20 µ2+1000 (-6+7 µ)-(100-50 µ) (15-37 µ+20 µ2))/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2)) 
FullSimplify[farkzf=zf30-z31] 
3996/(25-20 µ)+951/(6-4 µ)-7329/(20 µ)+1635/(-9+5 µ) 
Plot[{farkzh,farkzf},{µ,0,5/4}] 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
 3000
 2000
 1000
1000
2000
3000
 
 
NON-COOPERATIVE CASE: LIBERALIZING TRADE 
"0<µ<5/4" 
α=100 
100 
θ=50 
50 
ch=1000 
81 
1000 
cf=1 
1 
zhm=(cf (-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)+α (1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)+µ (2 ch 
(6777-12552 µ+5084 µ2)+θ (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3)))/(-243-1044 
µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
(-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2+100 (1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)+µ (2000 (6777-
12552 µ+5084 µ2)+50 (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3)))/(-243-1044 µ+28877 
µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
zht=(cf (-6+7 µ)+ch (21-44 µ+20 µ2)-(α-θ µ) (15-37 µ+20 µ2))/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2)) 
(-6+7 µ+1000 (21-44 µ+20 µ2)-(100-50 µ) (15-37 µ+20 µ2))/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2)) 
FullSimplify[farkzh=zhm-zht] 
1/10 (16350/(9-5 µ)+7992/(5-4 µ)-4332/µ+(5 (-35145+57062 µ))/(-9+µ (-119+62 
µ))+(4995 (-135+164 µ))/(27+µ (-241+164 µ))) 
Plot[farkzh,{µ,0,5/4}] 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
 1000
 500
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
 
zfm=(ch (-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)+α (1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)+µ (2 cf 
(6777-12552 µ+5084 µ2)+θ (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3)))/(-243-1044 
µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
(1000 (-1215-1035 µ+2782 µ2)+100 (1215-12519 µ+22322 µ2-10168 µ3)+µ (2 
(6777-12552 µ+5084 µ2)+50 (-1215+12519 µ-22322 µ2+10168 µ3)))/(-243-1044 
µ+28877 µ2-34458 µ3+10168 µ4) 
zft=(ch (-6+7 µ)+cf (21-44 µ+20 µ2)-(α-θ µ) (15-37 µ+20 µ2))/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2)) 
(21-44 µ+20 µ2+1000 (-6+7 µ)-(100-50 µ) (15-37 µ+20 µ2))/(µ (45-61 µ+20 µ2)) 
FullSimplify[farkzf=zfm-zft] 
1635/(9-5 µ)+831/(5 µ)+3996/(5 (-5+4 µ))+(35145-57062 µ)/(18+2 (119-62 µ) µ)-
(999 (-135+164 µ))/(54-482 µ+328 µ2) 
Plot[{farkzh,farkzf},{µ,0,5/4}] 
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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
 2000
 1000
1000
2000
 
Reduce[zhm>zht] 
µ<Root[-2368521-8077806 #1+28404945 #12-42759744 #13+31447144 #14-
8784232 #15+32800 #16&,1]||1/124 (119-13 97 )<µ<0||1/328 (241-
40369 )<µ<5/4||1/328 (241+ 40369 )<µ<9/5||1/124 (119+13 
97 )<µ<Root[-2368521-8077806 #1+28404945 #12-42759744 #13+31447144 
#14-8784232 #15+32800 #16&,2] 
 
 
COOPERATION CASE: BEFORE AND AFTER TRADE LIBERALIZATION  
 
"0<µ<5/4" 
α=100 
100 
θ=50 
50 
ch=1000 
1000 
cf=1 
1 
zm=((-41+65 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2)) 
((-41+65 µ) (801+100 µ))/(2 (-19-82 µ+65 µ2)) 
zt=((-3+4 µ) (cf+ch-2 α+2 θ µ))/(4 µ (-3+2 µ)) 
((-3+4 µ) (801+100 µ))/(4 µ (-3+2 µ)) 
FullSimplify[farkz=zm-zt] 
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-((801+100 µ) (57-76 µ+31 µ2))/(4 µ (57+208 µ-359 µ2+130 µ3)) 
Plot[farkz,{µ,0,5/4}] 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
 1000
 800
 600
 400
 200
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